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Executive Summary (Overall Findings/Results)
The aim of this project is to provide recommendations for improved surveillance for bovine Tuberculosis
(bTB) in English and Welsh cattle, considering three important, distinct problems:
1. In areas where there is a low incidence (Low Risk Areas or LRAs) of bTB in cattle and the default
testing regime is currently quadrennial, to identify approaches that will reduce the total testing
burden, without compromising the detection of herds containing infected cattle and efficiently
identify high risk herds, possibily for additional testing.
2. In areas where there is a high incidence (High Risk Areas or HRAs) of bTB in cattle, to identify
approaches that more quickly identify herds which may present a higher risk of onward transmission
to other herds.
3. In areas which are currently perceived as LRAs but are in danger of becoming HRAs (Transi-
tion Areas or TAs), to identify signatures of this transition, with an aim of informing increasing
surveillance (i.e. moving from (1) above to (2)) and or systematically curtailing spread of HRAs
themselves.
The work to achieve these objectives was delivered in four separate stages:
1. Identification of areas that could be epidemiologically classified as HRA, LRA and
TA. Conservative approaches were used to identify HRAs and LRAs, as these were considered to
be restricted to at most only those that were consistently under annual testing over the timeframe
to be HRAs, and for LRAs, considering only areas currently under quadrennial testing (i.e. since
the boundaries of quadrennial testing areas were simplified in 2013). The identification of TAs
is more complex, as the changes in testing regime over time do not necessarily reflect changing
epidemiological risk in a quantifiable fashion, and blur the epidemiological signal of increasing
outbreaks. Therefore, using a bespoke statistical model that balances off the two factors of ’local
risk’ and movement-based risk, for each year from 2003 to 2007, areas were identified (down to
a 10 km × 10 km grid square or ’quadrat’ resolution) that were statistically most likely for local
risk to be important, considering the spread of specific, genetically closely related groups (by
’spoligotype’) of outbreaks. Quadrats that were consistently identified as having identified local
risk over the entire timeframe were considered HRAs, those which never were identified as having
a local risk were considered LRAs, and those which were intermittently considered to have a local
risk becoming infected in the last year of the study were considered TAs.
2. Identification of statistical risk factors. In each area, the risk factors for breakdowns were
identified using a combination of statistical models. The following key outcomes are highlighted:
(a) Finishing herds increase the risk in HRAs, however, in LRAs they appear to have a similar
risk profile to beef. This suggests that increased breakdowns in finishing herds may be a good
indicator of an incipient local problem.
(b) Movements of cattle from HRAs are significant risk factors for the recent years of LRAs,
HRAs and for TAs. While they increase the risk in low risk areas, the results suggest that
they do not contribute to the increase of risk in HRAs and TAs.
(c) Imports from Ireland became a significant risk factor in the recent years in LRAs, but no
evidence of being important in other areas.
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(d) While risk factors suggest that large herds are important in all areas, it is in LRAs where they
have increased risk. Large herds will, in principle, have a more intensive inter-herd dynamic
by selling and buying more animals, increasing their risk of receiving infected animals from
HRAs and Ireland.
(e) There is statistical evidence that imputed badger density (and an interaction between imputed
badger density and beef herds) might be a significant risk factor in LRAs for the period 2008-
2013, however, given the known epidemiology of the disease, it is likely that this is a proxy for
other, geographically related correlates. This also suggests that the imputed badger densities
used here, need to be interpreted with caution.
The aim was to identify what signatures distinguished the three types of areas.
3. Identifying outcomes of revised surveillance strategies. With a previously developed
surveillance model that was used to identify targeted strategies in Scotland, for herds in LRAs
in England, a variety of testing regimes were considered with the aims of identifying the impact on
total breakdowns under better, similar or reduced surveillance levels (for full surveillance results,
see tables 12 to 17 in the main report). Our analyses suggest that:
(a) Slaughterhouse surveillance alone would result in substantially fewer detected infections than
the current system (140 compared to 161 in 2003-2008; 117 compared to 145 in 2009-2013),
which could increase the potential for onward transmission in LRAs and enhance the risk of
establishment of new HRAs.
(b) There appears to be little or no advantage to implementing additional testing in LRA England
(i.e. above the four-year testing scenario) since the probability of picking up additional
infections is very low. The one-year and two-year baseline scenarios show that the number
of detected infections is very similar to the four-year regime (154 and 159 compared to 161
in 2003-2008; 137 and 143 compared to 145 in 2009-2013), and they do present fewer latent
infections (5 and 15 compared to 31 in 2003-2008; 4 and 14 compared to 31 in 2009-2013), but
require additional herd tests (19564 and 9782 compared to 4891 in 2003-2008; 12939 and 6469
compared to 3234 in 2009-2013) and result in more false positives (433 and 216 compared to
108 in 2003-2008; 287 and 143 compared to 71 in 2009-2013).
(c) A number of the tested scenarios offer clear advantages over the others. In scenarios 1 and
2, some herds are exempt from routine herd testing (RHT) due to sending many cattle to
slaughter, but others are tested more frequently due to movements of cattle from high risk
areas in England and Wales, and due to Irish imports. Scenarios 1-2, when compared to
the current regime, present similar or better levels of detection of breakdowns (163 and 160
compared to 160 in 2003-2008; 148 and 145 compared to 145 in 2009-2013), a similar number
of mean latent infections (30 and 33 compared to 31 in 2003-2008; 28 and 32 compared to
31 in 2009-2013), and present fewer false positives (94 and 81 compared to 108 in 2003-2008;
68 and 55 compared to 71 in 2009-2013). They test fewer herds (4262 and 3729 compared to
4891 in 2003-2008; 3064 and 2531 compared to 3234 in 2009-2013) than the current regime,
and they can detect on average 82% of the breakdowns identified by RHT (16 out of 21 in
2003-2008; 8 out of 9 in 2009-2013). In contrast, while scenarios 7-8 (which include more
frequent RHT of high risk herds, and no exemptions) only offer minimal benefits for the
additional tests done. There are very similar levels of detection of breakdowns (162 and 161
compared to 161 in 2003-2008; 146 and 145 compared to 145 in 2009-2013) and a similar
number of latent infections (30 in both scenarios compared to 31 in both 2003-2008 and 2009-
2013) when compared to the current regime. However, they do present a higher number of
false positives (125 and 118 compared to 108 in 2003-2008; 84 and 80 compared to 71 in 2009-
2013) and a higher number of herds tested (5427 and 5173 compared to 4891 in 2003-2008;
3626 and 3486 compared to 3234 in 2009-2013) than the current regime. Because there is no
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exemption from testing in scenarios 7-8, these can detect 100% of the breakdowns identified
under current testing regimes.
(d) In LRA England, scenarios 3-4 that penalize herds that slaughter small percentages of their
stock and have been importing animals from risky areas for a long period (and have more
than 100 animals - scenario 4 only) offer a saving of the number of herds tested during both
time periods when compared to the current scenario (2823 and 3301 compared to 4891 in
2003-2008; 2074 and 2827 compared to 3234 in 2009-2013), and fewer false positives (61 and
81 compared to 108 in 2003-2008; 45 and 68 compared to 71 in 2009-2013), however, they
detect slightly fewer infected herds (158 and 156 compared to 161 in 2003-2008; 143 in both
scenarios compared to 145 in 2009-2013), and show a greater number of latent infections (36
and 38 compared to 31 in 2003-2008; 34 and 33 compared to 31 in 2009-2013) when compared
to the current scenario. Scenarios 5-6 are a replicate of scenario 4 but with cutoffs for testing
exemptions occurring only for comparatively larger herds. These scenarios offer a saving of
the number of herds tested during both periods when compared to the current scenario (1811
and 1654 compared to 4891 in 2003-2008; 1803 and 1682 compared to 3234 in 2009-2013) and
produce fewer false positives (41 and 35 compared to 108 in 2003-2008; 41 and 37 compared
to 71 in 2009-2013), however, they detect fewer infected herds (151 and 150 compared to 161
in 2003-2008; 140 for both scenarios compared to 144 in 2009-2013), and they show a greater
number of latent infections (44 and 45 compared to 31 in 2003-2008; 38 and 39 compared to
31 in 2009-2013).
4. Within herd models of bTB transmission identified substantial detection delays that might result
in breakdowns should infections be seeded in herds exempt from RHT. While this is not likely
to create onward consequences should RHT exempt herds of sending cattle to other herds, the
possibility of onward infection otherwise needs to be considered carefully, possibly requiring ad-
ditional measures such as enhanced pre-movement testing. These models showed that dairy and
beef herds in HRAs show similar epidemiological characteristics with no evidence that one or the
other presents substantially more inherent individual level risk of cattle-to-cattle transmission (i.e.
beyond risks due to high levels trading), though they suggest that dairy herds may experience a
higher level of risk due to external infection sources.
While we view these recommendations as robust given the epidemiological knowledge and data
available to us, a critical consideration when reviewing these recommendations is the knowledge
that the landscape of bTB transmission to cattle herds in GB is always changing, because of
natural factors (the epidemiology of bTB in cattle and badgers), changes in the industry, and
due to responses to changes in legislation. As such, while in our view the principles behind the
recommendations are sound, the specific quantitative aspects of the recommendations would require




Bovine Tuberculosis (bTB) in cattle is the most economically important and controversial disease of live-
stock in Great Britain, with important impacts on animal health and welfare, and farmers’ livelihoods
and well-being. The primary requirement of surveillance for bovine Tuberculosis in British cattle is the
timely identification of infected cattle in order to reduce onward infection (particularly between herds)
with the aim to contain, control and if possible, ultimately reduce the incidence due to cattle-to-cattle
transmission. Current testing regimes for bTB, while already sensitive to some differences in herd risk
status, could be enhanced by a more targeted approach that considers the epidemiological evidence of
risk found in the comprehensive data on bTB in British cattle, in order to either reduce testing of cattle
(thereby saving cost and effort), or enhancing identification of infection (thereby reducing onward risk),
or both.
There are three primary means by which targeted surveillance might improve the testing/detection
balance in Great Britain:
1. In areas where cattle are clearly at a low risk of infection with bTB, a reduction of testing, if it
does not compromise detection, will both reduce costs to government and reduce the burden on
farmers. This is the approach used in Scotland, where only herds at a sufficiently high infection
risk, mostly due to imports of cattle from areas at high risk of bTB, are tested regularly. Some
improvements may also be achieved by more intensive testing of higher risk herds.
2. In areas where there is a high risk of infection with bTB, enhanced testing of herds that are more
likely to spread bTB to other cattle could detect these more rapidly, and thereby, reduce onward
spread.
3. In areas where there is believed to be a low risk of infection, but there is danger of transition due
to the spread of high risk areas. Improvement on surveillance to identify this transition will both
identify where surveillance needs to be enhanced by further testing, and potentially prevent high
risk areas from spreading.
The existing bTB surveillance regime already includes some elements of risk-based targeting of surveil-
lance, for example in the form of different minimum frequencies of routine herd testing (every 1 or 4
years) with those under 4 year testing largely assured of being low risk. Additionally, certain herd types
that are perceived to be at higher risk of acquiring infection are subject to the most stringent testing
frequency (annual) regardless of their location. Pre-movement bTB testing also targets herds situated in
the endemic/high risk bTB regions. This project aims to identify further means of improving targeted
surveillance, considering all of the above three circumstances.
The expansion of areas in Great Britain (GB) with a high incidence of herd breakdowns of bTB
remains largely unexplained and poorly quantified. The crux of this proposal is a new and epidemio-
logically robust way of defining the manner in which areas are defined as high or low risk, with areas
that become high risk over a specified time frame, identified as transitional. Based on historical data,
and modifying an approach originally developed in a previous Defra project, we have identified areas
which were transitional in the analysed time frame (concentrating on LRAs that have become persistent
HRAs). By analysing risk factors (including imputed badger presence/absence data) associated with
each of the area types (high risk, low risk and transitional), we aim to address the risk-based surveillance
requirements across all three. Since breakdowns can be seeded a considerable time prior to detection,
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the difference in testing regime times can exacerbate the establishment of new areas where cattle herds
are at a higher risk of breakdown (HRAs).
Purpose of the work
1. Development and analysis of locations of HRAs and TAs
2. Statistical analysis of underlying risk factors for breakdowns in HRA, LRAs and TAs
3. Application of the Scottish risk-based surveillance model to long term LRAs to reduce testing
4. Use mathematical models to determine consequences of possible missed breakdowns
Methods
1. Development and analysis of locations of HRAs and TAs
Source data
The source data used for this analysis were extracted from the Cattle Tracing System (CTS) of
GB, provided by RADAR (Rapid Analysis and Detection of Animal-related Risks), and details of
bTB breakdowns were extracted from DEFRA’s animal health database, VetNet. Cattle move-
ments are represented as daily reported links between pairs of CTS herds using cattle ID numbers.
Breakdowns were identified according to date and CPH from confirmed cases in the VetNet data.
Genotype data consisting of spoligpotypes and VNTR types of M. bovis were obtained from the
Animal & Plant Health Agency (APHA). Three of the provided genotypes were chosen for in-
vestigation on the basis of its geographical predominance in expanding regions of high-incidence
(used in the model developed by [13] on the prediction of high-risk areas of bTB). These were
genotypes 25:a (spoligotype 25 (SB0129), VNTR type 6− 5− 5− 4∗ − 2− 3.1 mainly prevalent in
the English Midlands around Stoke-on-Trent), genotype 10: a (spoligotype 10 (SB0272), VNTR
type 7 − 5 − 5 − 4∗ − 3 − 3.1 on the Welsh borders) and genotype 9: b (spoligotype 9 (SB0140),
VNTR type 7− 5− 5− 5∗ − 3− 2.1, in SW Wales). Each of three genotype datasets were linked
to breakdowns in VetNet via cattle eartag numbers to generate a list of herd breakdowns for each
genotype.
Identification and characterization of genotype-specific TAs
In the work developed by Orton and Colleagues ([13] under Defra Project SE3243), GB was divided
into 10× 10 km quadrats and each spoligotype was assigned to each quadrat (see Figure 1).
That analysis was refined and expanded here, with a three-phase process used to identify HRAs
in terms of these quadrats:
• In the first phase, each quadrant for a specific genotype was used individually in a simulation as
the sole HRA to explain cattle herd breakdowns for that genotype, considering both presence
in the quadrat and movements of cattle out of it, and the likelihood of the overall spoligotype
specific epidemic recorded. Any quadrant with more than two herds breaking down with
the selected genotype during the study period 2003-2007 were considered for evaluation as
an HRA. Epidemic likelihoods were obtained from Nelmer-Mead simplex fits, with the best
likelihood observed used to rank the quadrats.
• In the second phase of model selection, these quadrats were sequentially aggregated into a
larger HRA, considering the quadrant with the likelihood from phase one, in order down to
the lowest likelihood. The model likelihood was reevaluated with each quadrant addition and
the result recorded. A plot of the change in likelihood would be expected to show an overall
initial increase in likelihood (since a single quadrat would be unlikely to be the only HRA),
but then eventually start to decline as too many quadrats become included as HRAs.
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Figure 1: M. bovis spoligotypes in cattle by quadrat of 10 × 10 Km for GB, based on all available
data to 2010. Quadrats where more than 50% of typed isolates belong to an individual spoligotype are
indicated by colour, with category ”999” indicating insuficient data (< 6 brekadowns) and ”0” (dark
grey) representing inconclusives - ie. greater than 5 breakdowns but without a dominant spoligotype.
In our study, we focus on the spoligotyes highlighted with a square: S9b (red), S10a (blue) and S25a
(orange).
• In the third phase of the model evaluation, in order to improve the method used in the second
phase, the quadrats are reordered in order to smooth the curve. E.g. if the original order
is 1-2-3-4-5, and the likelihood when quadrats 1-2 are evaluated is lower than for quadrat 1
alone, and for 1-2-3-4 lower than for 1-2-3, the quadrats are reordered as 1-3-5-2-4 and the
likelihoods reevaulated as quadrats are accumulated.
This process was repeated for five different three year evaluation windows, for the years 2003-2007
(see Figure 2).
Definition of TAs. Figure 2 shows that these quadrats show considerable variability in the
number of areas considered high-risk for the period 2003-2007. A quadrat was considered transi-
tional if it was intermittently considered to have a local risk becoming infected in the last year of
the study period.
2. Statistical analysis of underlying risk factors for breakdowns in HRAs, LRAs and TAs.
The basis for this analysis is largely standard statistical GLM models run in the R programming
environment. In addition, established machine learning approaches are used as exible methods to
determine the relative predictive power of cattle movements to determine the risk of breakdowns
in LRAs.
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Figure 2: All quadrats for the genotypes S9b, S10a, S25a showing years in which they are designated
high risk. Quadrats that appear within the largest contiguous group are in grey, those that appear in
isolation (outside of the largest group) in black. Only type 25:a shows evidence of clear HRA expansion,
while the HRAs for types 9:b and 10:a appears to fluctuate without covering substantially greater areas
or with clear signs of steady expansion. Therefore an interesting comparison is whether type 25:a shows
different underlying risk factors, compared to the other two genotype ’transitional’ areas.
2.1. Risk factors as predictors of bTB breakdowns in Scotland and LRA England.
Source data
In this work we combine two datasets: the Cattle Tracing System (CTS) movement data (RADAR),
and the VetNet records of bTB tests and breakdowns (DEFRA). The CTS database contains
records of all inwards and outward cattle movements in Great Britain. We used a version of the
dataset with markets stripped from movements: a movement from farm1 to a market to farm2
is recorded as a movement from farm1 to farm2.
We use CTS movements and VetNet breakdowns to generate a variety of risk ratings for each cattle
movement from 2006 to 2011 and a risk rating for each farm based on the ratings of their inward
movements for each year of the study period.
Movement risk ratings
Let mijt = 1 be a movement if farm i to farm j on data t. Let N(mijt) be the number of animals
moved on that day between those farms. For each movement, four different risk ratings were
calculated:
• Rcounty(mijt) = 1 if farm i is in 1-year testing county, 0 otherwise.
• Rnum(mijt) = k where k is the number of animals moved if i has had a bTB breakdown within
ten years previous to t, 0 otherwise.
• Rnum,time(mijt) = k ln(t− tB) where k is the number of animals moved and tB is the date of
the most recent breakdown at i if i has had a bTB breakdown within ten years previous to t,
0 otherwise.
• Rtime(mijt) = ln(t− tB) where tB is the date of the most recent breakdown at i if i has had
a bTB breakdown within ten years previous to t, 0 otherwise.
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Farm risk ratings
For farm j in year y:
• Rcounty(i) =
∑
Rcounty(mijt) where t is within two years previous to y.
• Rnum(i) =
∑
Rnum(mijt) where t is within two years previous to y.
• Rnum,time(i) =
∑
Rnum,time(mijt) where t is within two years previous to y.
• Rtime(i) =
∑
Rtime(mijt) where t is within two years previous to y.
Stump classifiers
A stump classifier is a simple threshold classifier. Given a threshold and a set of rated examples
(in this case, farms with risk ratings), we classified all examples with ratings above the threshold as
positive, and below the threshold as negative. For a given rating measure, we choose a threshold,
and we classify everything below the threshold, as non-risky, and everything above as risky.
Figure 3: Example of a stump classifier. A stump classifier is a machine-learning model consisting
of a one-level decision tree. A decision stump makes a prediction based on the value of a just single
input feature.
At each threshold, we compare the results with bTB breakdowns and record the number of true
positives and false positives. The curve joining these points is a Receiver Operator Characteristic
(ROC) curve (Figure 4), therefore, each curve represents the analysis of one risk rating for one
given year.
Figure 4: ROC curve. A measure of true and false positive rates over all the thresholds to assess
the performance of the diagnostic test (perfect classifier: upper left hand corner; no-information
random classifier: diagonal line).
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These curves are commonly used in machine learning and radiology (for example) to assess the
performance of a classifier or diagnostic test. A perfect classifier would be in the upper left hand
corner of the plot, a no-information random classifier would be on the diagonal line from bottom
left to top right corner.
2.2. Statistical analysis of underlying risk factors for breakdowns in LRAs, HRAs and
TAs
Source data
In order to calculate the herd-level prevalence of infection, risk factors for herds in England and
Wales with confirmed bTB test reactors were modelled. Herd attributes including herd type and
location were collated into tables for the periods of interest (2002-2008 and 2008-2013) while his-
toric bTB test results and incidence data were extracted from SAM’s database provided by the
Animal & Plant Health Agency (APHA). The aforementioned tables were combined in order to
create the large base datasets used to construct the statistical models.
The births, deaths, imports and movements of individual cattle were extracted from the British
Cattle Movement System’s Cattle Tracing System (CTS).
Average holding size for each year was calculated using CTS by incorporating all recorded cattle
movements off and on to individual herds. The result of these calculations was provided by APHA.
Additional data on the historical SICCT test interval data by parish was used in order to differen-
tiate low incidence and high incidence herds through time. Only those herds that were in entirely
low or in entirely high incidence areas during the time periods of interest were considered in the
risk factor analyses.
Data on herds located in TAs were also used ([13]). Transitional areas of England and Wales
from 2003-2007 were identified using M. bovis spoligotype data provided by APHA. These areas
were divided into 100 km2 quadrats and assigned incidence information, which is based on the
predominant testing interval in the area and on a bespoke statistical model used to identify quadrats
where a locally based risk was likely. The data set was further subdivided by the number of years
of the potential five each quadrat spent in high incidence areas.
Data on the density of badgers were derived from work presented in [14]. The authors estimated
the density of main badger setts for all the cells (resolution 100 × 100 m) in England and Wales
by using the Mahalanobis distance statistic (D2), which is a presence only modeling technique. To
do so, they have used stratified random samples of sett locations in combination with biologically
relevant landscape data. The imputed badger density values were added to the herd dataset by
matching for the location of each herd.
Statistical analysis
Multivariate logistic mixed models to assess candidate risk factor were formulated in which the
outcome was 1 if herd i in county j recorded one or more confirmed incidences of bTB in year
k and 0 if there was not. Models were constructed using data from 2002-2008 and 2008-2013 for
both low and high risk areas as well as from 2003-2007 for the transitional areas. Both year and
county acted as random effects in order to estimate the mean distribution of the outcome in every
permutation of year and county as well as to control for any influence these values may have on
estimating herd level prevalence of infection.
The following fixed effects were considered for the analyses:
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(a) The mean number of cattle on a holding for each year. This variable was further categorised as
1-50, 51-100, 101-200, 201-350, 351-500 and>500 animals, corresponding with those categories
used in the RADAR 2008 Cattle Book.
(b) The consolidated herd types found in SAM’s database. These types were reduced to beef,
dairy, finishing, suckler and stores according to Table 1. An additional group including herds
that did not fall into the aforementioned categories (Other category) was excluded due to the
poor representation of these herds in the bTB incidence database.
(c) A binary response indicating whether a holding imported any cattle from either the Republic
of Ireland or Northern Ireland in the previous year.
(d) The number of batches of cattle arriving from high incidence areas of England and Wales in
the previous year. This value was categorised as 0, 1-10, and >10.
(e) The predicted imputed density of badgers per km2. This value was centred and divided by
two standard deviations to normalise its distribution in order to facilitate model fitting.
General Herd Type Specific Herd Categories
Beef
Beef, BEEF, Beef Bull Hirer, Beef Dealer, Beef
Heifer Rearer, BISON, Bull Beef, Dealer,
DEALER, Meat
Dairy
Dairy, DAIRY, Dairy Bull Hirer, Dairy Dealer,






Suckler Suckler, BEEF SUCKLER
Other All the other categories in SAM’s DB
Table 1: Characterization of herd types in their sub-categories according to SAM’s database. The
’Other’ category is not used in our analyses.
Models were evaluated using the AIC model selection score, the most appropriate information
criteria in models where false negatives would be more misleading than false positives. The best fit
models were chosen by back-fitting the listed fixed effects, forward-fitting the random effects (county
and year) and finally back-fitting the fixed effects once more to recheck the selected variables. This
rechecking is done because the inclusion of random effects may, sometimes, render certain fixed
effects no longer significant. The significant fixed effects are presented as odds ratios (Odds) with
95% confidence intervals. The data were prepared using a combination of UNIX shell commands
for basic text editing and R for data management. The multivariate logistic mixed models were
constructed in the lme4 package in R ([17]). The best fit models were chosen using fitLMER.fnc,
which is part of the R package LMERConvenienceFunctions ([18]).
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3. Application of the Scottish risk-based surveillance model to long term LRAs to reduce
testing
The aims of these analyses are the following:
• Evaluate whether slaughterhouse surveillance alone is sufficient to ensure a high level of con-
fidence of freedom from infection
• Evaluate alternative strategies to RHT that are based upon risk. This should incorporate
both the risk of infection and the risk of detection at slaughterhouse
• Minimize the number of false-positive herds identified by testing
These analyses used the mixed logistic regression model from section 2 to define the probability of a
herd becoming infected, and implemented components of a stochastic simulation model developed
by APHA (then AHVLA, the meta-analysis study team, personal communication), to calculate
the probability of a herd’s freedom from infection. Data from the original Scottish study (covering
the period 2003-2008) was compared to data from England and Wales over the same period, and
to data from England and Wales to a more recent period (2009-2013).
Source data
The data used for this analysis were derived from SAM’s and CTS. The following steps were used
to derive the cattle herd data:
(a) All herds with a unique CPH number on the SAM’s herd table that were active during all of
the years of each study period (2002-2008 and 2008-2013) and located in LRAs were identified.
(b) Of the herds identified above, only those that had animals recorded on CTS were included.
For these, the average number of animals in the herd per year was calculated. Only the ones
that had herd size > 0 were included.
(c) Herds with a unique CPH but with multiple herd types were excluded from the analysis.
(d) One spatial location was chosen at random for herds with a unique CPH that had multiple
database entries with different spatial locations.
(e) The number of animals sent to slaughter from these herds in each year was calculated.
During 2003-2008, all eligible herds in Scotland were tested once every 4 years under the routine
herd testing (RHT) policy and supplemented by further herd tests: post-movement and post-
Irish import triggered by moving, respectively, cattle from HRA England and Wales, and Ireland
into Scotland, contact tracing following a confirmed breakdown, and retest of animals that had
inconclusive results during their SICCT test (60 days later) (Table 9).
During 2003-2008 and 2009-2013, all eligible herds in LRA England were also tested once every 4
years under the routine herd testing (RHT) policy and supplemented by the following tests (not
an exhaustive list):
• Contiguous herd carried out on herds contiguous to OTFW (Officially Tuberculosis Free status
withdrawn) herds.
• 1st hotspot check carried out if a holding is within a 3 km radius of an incident, which triggers
a potential hotspot area.
• Pre-movement test to be carried out 60 days or less prior to movement of animals from an
annually tested herd.
• Whole-Herd-Testing (WHT), which are carried out routinely every 12 months in annual testing
areas and in individual herds requiring annual testing, e.g. producer-retailer dairy herds, bull
hirers, heifer rearers, city/open farms, AI centres, etc. Can also be carried out via Regional
Veterinary Lead (RVL) discretion in 48 month testing areas.
12
• Tracing carried out outside the normal testing frequency for the herd, to determine its disease
status when there is a suspicion of infection. This will follow the back tracing of OTFW
reactors found in another herd.
• Post-movement test to be carried out in circumstances where cattle have been moved into a
holding without a required pre-movement test.
• Post-Irish import test carried on cattle imported from Northern Ireland and the Republic of
Ireland 60 days after arrival.
• Inconclusive reactor retest carried out on inconclusive reactors identified at an earlier test.
To be conducted at least 60 days later.
Model description
To evaluate the likelihood of herd-level freedom from infection with bTB during a specified time
period (t) the model requires that the following parameters are defined:
(a) The probability of the herd becoming infected during t (p(intro)). This is derived from the
regression model in the previous section.
(b) The number of animals in the herd (N).
(c) The bTB surveillance implemented on the farm:
i. Slaughterhouse
ii. Whole herd testing (i.e. testing the entire herd)
iii. The herd-level prevalence of infection pstar
The efficacy of the surveillance system is evaluated by calculating the herd-level test system sensi-
tivity sesystem, which includes the routine whole herd SICCT testing and part herd slaughterhouse
testing:
sesystem = 1− (1− seherd)(1− separt),
in which seherd is the sensitivity of the SICCT implemented as a herd test, and separt is the
part herd sensitivity for slaughterhouse surveillance. The herd sensitivity for a whole herd test is
calculated as:
seherd = 1− (1− seSICCT )d,
in which d is the number of infected animals in the herd defined as:
d = N × pstar.
The value d is derived from the product of a beta(2,90) distribution and the annual average number
of animals in the herd provided by APHA. The sensitivity for a part herd test for the proportion
of the herd that is sent to slaughterhouse is:
separt = 1− (1− n× seslh
N
)d,
where n is the number of animals sent to slaughter. In this analysis, the distributions of the test
sensitivities were defined by a meta-analysis performed by the APHA meta-analysis study team
(personal communication; [21]: seSICCT = 69.30% and seherd = 51.11%. The specificity of the
whole herd test is defined as follows:
spherd = 1− spnanimal,
where n = N for whole herd tests and spanimal is the specificity of the test (99.58%). The
probability of freedom (the posterior) at t is given by:
p(free) =
1− priort
(1− priort) + priort × (1− sesystem) ,
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where priort is the prior probability that the herd is infected. The prior for t+ 1 is:
priort+1 = ((1− p(free)t) + p(intro))− ((1− p(free)t)× p(intro)).
The model was implemented in the R statistical environment and run for 100 simulations. The
model was implemented for all eligible herds in LRA England for the years between 2002-2008 and
2008-2013. The extra year at the beginning of the study period was to enable a ’burn-in’ period
for the model to ensure that it was stable for the period of the simulation. For whole herd tests
over a regular repeated period (such as four-year testing) the start year of the herd testing cycle
was generated randomly for each iteration.
The following were used as likely determinants of the risk of infection and subsequent detection:
(a) The size of herds - larger herds being at greater risk of infection.
(b) The proportion of the herd’s total stock that is sent to slaughter during each time period -
herds that send less stock to the slaughterhouse require more surveillance.
(c) Where the holding sources its stock - whether the holding is buying in animals from HRA in
England, Wales, Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland.
Four different baseline scenarios can be modelled based upon an annual time-frame for surveillance
and assuming that slaughterhouse surveillance will continue:
(a) Slaughterhouse surveillance only
(b) Four year testing: WHT for all herds for every 4 years and slaughterhouse surveillance
(c) Two year testing: WHT for all herds for every 2 years and slaughterhouse surveillance
(d) One year testing: annual WHT for all herds and slaughterhouse surveillance
The following 8 risk-based scenarios below were also simulated. Here, the surveillance system is
based on a point scoring system, with points added or subtracted based on perceived increases or
reductions in risk.
• Scenario 1:
– Slaughtering 25% of stock (+1)
– Receiving ’high-risk’ animals in > 3 years and slaughtering < 50% of stock (+1)
• Scenario 2:
– Slaughtering < 25% of stock and/or receiving ’high risk’ animals in > 3 years and slaugh-
tering < 40% of stock (1)
• Scenario 3:
– Slaughtering < 12.5% of stock and/or receiving ’high risk’ animals in > 3 years and
slaughtering < 25% of stock (1)
• Scenario 4:
– Slaughtering > 25% of stock (-1)
– Slaughtering < 5% of stock (+1)
– Receiving ’high risk’ animals in > 3 years (+1)
– Having > 100 animals (+1)
• Scenario 5:
– Slaughtering > 25% of stock (-1)
– Slaughtering < 5% of stock (+1)
– Receiving ’high risk’ animals in > 3years (+1)
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– Having > 350 animals (+1)
• Scenario 6:
– Slaughtering > 25% of stock (-1)
– Slaughtering < 5% of stock (+1)
– Receiving ’high risk’ animals in > 3years (+1)
– Having > 500 animals (+1)
• Scenario 7:
– Having > 350 animals (3)
– Having ≤ 350 animals (1)
• Scenario 8:
– Having > 500 animals (3)
– Having ≤ 500 animals (1)
Model evaluation
The risk-based scenarios were evaluated for the time frames 2003-2008 and 2009-2013 by comparing
the following variables to the equivalent fitted values from the four-year RHT surveillance:
(a) The annual number of herds tested
(b) The annual number of cattle tested
(c) The annual fitted number of detected infections (priort − p(free)t)
(d) The annual number of latent infections (1− p(free)t)
(e) The annual expected number of false positives (spherd)
A false positive is defined as an unconfirmed reactor.
4. Use mathematical models to determine consequences of possible missed breakdowns
In order to evaluate evidence for differences in within-herd transmission characteristics across dif-
ferent herd types, the within-herd transmission of bTB is modelled as a hierarchy of nested model
structures, where, in the simplest case, cattle are either susceptible, exposed, test sensitive, or
infectious, and models fitted to outbreak data for (in the first instance) dairy vs. beef cattle break-
downs. As well as infection structure, risk group specific age structure was accounted for, with
each infectious stage further split into NA separate age groups.
Susceptible cattle become exposed through infectious contact within the herd, and through external
factors that may include for example, inward cattle movements, contiguous spread from neighbour-
ing herds, or the presence of a wildlife reservoir. These external factors are incorporated into the
model via a single force of infection. The model is depicted schematically in Figure 5. Once an ani-
mal becomes infectious it remains so until it is detected, at which point the animal would be culled.
We allow for heterogeneity in the infectiousness of individuals by incorporating ‘super-spreaders’;
i.e. with some individuals more likely than average to infect others if, for example, it excretes
more bacteria than average, as suggested by experimental data [1]. A fraction of the herd, PS , are
modelled as super-spreaders where the transmission term is scaled by a factor ζS .
The average infectiousness of individuals may vary between herds [2] and this is incorporated into
the model by allowing transmission of the disease for all livestock to be scaled by a factor ζH in a
proportion of herds, PH , and similarly we consider two levels of variability in α.
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Figure 5: Disease propagation though the infection stages, susceptible, exposed, test sensitive and
infectious in the age-based SETI model. Individuals move either into a new infection stage (hor-
izontally) or to the next age bracket (vertically) as denoted by subscripts. There are two classes
of infectious individuals; super-spreaders (when included in the model) are categorised as super-
infectious where the transmission parameter is scaled by the value ζ.
The deterministic model is written as an ODE
dSi
dt
= −βSiI − ζSβSiIsuper − νiSi + ℵi (Si−1 − Si) |i>1 − αSi
dEi
dt
= βSiI + ζSβSiI
super − σEi − νiEi + ℵi (Ei−1 − Ei) |i>1 + αSi
dTi
dt
= σEi − γTi − νiTi + ℵi (Ti−1 − Ti) |i>1
dIi
dt
= (1− PS) γTi − νiIi + ℵi (Ii−1 − Ii) |i>1
dIsuperi
dt




where subscripts denote the age group, infection states with no subscript means the sum over all
groups e.g. I =
∑
i Ii and α is the force of infection external to the herd. The parameters ℵi is
the rate cattle in one age group move up to the next (older) age group so that ℵiSi−1(t) is the
number of cattle entering the Si(t) state and ℵiSi(t) the number leaving. Cattle in the oldest age
group are removed from the system at the rate ℵNA . Cattle are also removed from the herd (via
death or export) at a rate νi where we allow for age specific removal rates giving νiSi(t) as the
number of susceptible cattle in the ith age group being removed from the herd at time t. In each
simulated epidemic we assume a constant herd size, assuming replacements are drawn from the
same age distribution. We make the simpiflying assumption that replacements are all susceptible;
in HRAs the effect of having some infectious replacements is subsumed in α while in LRAs, where
movements from HRAs are few, the likelihood of multiple introduction is low, due to the low overall
prevalence of infection in all cattle (of 5,417,573 tests carried out in 2006 only 20,090 confirmed
reactors were found [3]).
As herd size is known to be correlated to infection persistence [4] (Figure 6) we assume density
dependent transmission, with infection occuring at at base rate βIS. Exposed cattle become test
sensitive at a rate σ and then infectious at a rate γ.
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Figure 6: Number of reactors detected to the herd size at breakdown as a function of herd size
(inset shows a detailed view of small herds). The correlation is weak but suggests some density
dependence (Spearman ρ value of 0.277).
Variability in ζH and α are implicit as herd heterogeneity is determined before each individual
simulation with fitted probabilities.
We assume outbreaks are initially seeded by a single randomly chosen infected animal. Similar
to others [5], we assume that the occurrence of breakdowns due to the introduction of multiple
infections is low; this likely causes a compensatory increase in the estimated transmission rate but
we expect this effect to be small (see above on national prevalence).
The model (1) was solved by running 2 × 104 independent simulations using Gillespie’s τ -leap
method with a fixed time step of 14 days to balance simulation efficiency and model accuracy. We
used Gillespie Direct Method [6] to validate the choice of time step in the τ -leap method. In each
simulation, herd size and age structure are selected from the observed distribution in GB and run
to the random predetermined future date selected from a uniform distribution over 0 to n years
where n is the testing interval. We then perform a RHT with test sensitivity Ωr. The number of
reactors at the time of a test, NB, is therefore
NB = binom (T (t) + I (t) + I
super (t),Ωr ) (2)
If no infected cattle are detected we schedule another RHT n years later and continue running
the simulation. If, at any time, an animal is removed from the herd it is subjected to a post
mortem test with net sensitivity Ωs, considering the combined probability of being inspected and
detected. A positive test triggers a breakdown resulting in a whole herd tuberculin test (WHT).
Any confirmed breakdown sets the RHT schedule to every two months until there are no further
reactors. When a breakdown is detected (by either RHT or at abattoir), the breakdown size is
added to a frequency distribution for routine and triggered WHT tests from which we compare the
distribution to the number of reactors at first detection as recorded in VetNet. Each simulation is
run for a maximum of 20 years.
The frequency distribution of reactors at first breakdown is interpreted as a multinomial trial with
x1, x2, . . . , xn as the number of times we detected 1, 2, . . . , n reactors in the herd at breakdown in
the simulation and we calculate the probabilities p1, p2, . . . , pn for both the breakdowns detected
from routine RHT and abattoir triggered WHT using the observed (age independent) breakdown





where n is the total number of breakdowns observed in the simulation and xi are the frequencies of
detecting each breakdown size in our simulations. The free parameters in the described model are
θ = {β, σ, γ,Ωr,Ωs, PS , PH , ζS , ζH , α}. We calculate the expected value of the model for a given
parameter set, θ as
E[θ] = 〈`(D(θ)|θ)〉
where D(θ) is the result of simulating the epidemic with θ, and the calculated likelihood is the
mean of 10000 simulations of the model as described above. We find that 10000 is the smallest
sample size that we can use to have an acceptable variance in our results. We perform a Markov
random walk using the Metropolis-Hastings rejection algorithm in the parameter space defined by
θ to find the posterior values of θ that correspond the maximum of the likelihood.
We run 5 different chains for each simulation with different initial conditions (θ0) and run 6000
steps. The posterior distribution is determined by removing the ‘burn-in’ from the chains. The
model was coded in JAVA. The inference scheme was tested for self-consistency by running simu-
lated epidemics using the model structures as defined above and using our inference approach to
estimate the model parameters. These were shown to recover the input parameters with posterior
distributions of similar width to those identified for our real data, and with the original parameters
lying within the 95% credible intervals of the posteriors (results not shown).
Source data
Cattle test data were obtained from the VetNet and Vebus databases obtained from APHA. The
cattle distributions throughout GB were obtained from the CTS database (RADAR). We use RHT
and WHT records from 2006 because it was sufficiently long after the 2001 foot and mouth dis-
ease outbreak for the resultant perturbations in bTB incidence to have disappeared and because
quadrennial testing areas expanded rapidly before that year. More recently, the expansion of an-
nual testing areas to cover many regions of relatively low incidence results in additional variability
in the testing history of cattle (e.g. many herds moving from 4 year to annual testing in recent
years) which would complicate the fitting procedure. This dataset was filtered to consider only
breakdowns triggered by RHTs or through tracing from abattoir detection in parishes exclusively
tested annually from 1998 to 2006, i.e had a test type of ’VE-RHT’, ’VE-WHT’, ’VE-WHT2’
or ’VE-SLH’ in VetNet. Also, we consider only breakdowns where there had not been a previ-
ous positive test in the herd and do not consider the results of follow-up tests; this minimizes
the impact of possible infections missed from previous outbreaks, and mitigates against possibly
epidemiologically significant changes in farmer behaviour after an outbreak begins. This left 315
reactors in herds recorded as beef herds in VetNet, and 208 reactors in dairy herds in high risk.
Only herd breakdowns with confirmed reactors (i.e. where visible lesions have been identified)
are included; unconfirmed reactors are statistically more likely to show up as reactors later [9].
Inconclusive unconfirmed reactors that never test positive are excluded from the analysis; though
there is a statistically significant risk of transmission indirectly associated with them, the absolute
risk is slight [10], and therefore likely to be dominated by the transmission from confirmed reactors.
Distribution of priors
The distribution of the number of reactors at first breakdown defines the likelihood function (Equa-
tion 3). We calculate the distribution of herd sizes based on the recorded number of cattle when it
first suffered a breakdown (i.e. using the same criteria used to obtain the breakdown size distribu-
tion to define our likelihood). We use the age structure as found in VetNet, the age distribution of
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reactors and the age distribution of cattle sent to slaughter, identifying 14 age groups with lengths
from 2-24 months. Uniformly distributed priors based on field and experimental data were used
where found (Table 2) [11, 12] with non-informative priors where no estimates existed.
Parameter Description Sampling Distribution
β
transmission rate Uniform[1× 10−5, 1× 10−2]
σ rate of exposed cattle becoming test sensitive Uniform[6 hours− 100 days]
γ rate of test sensitive cattle becoming infectious Uniform[4 months−9 months]
Ωr
probability that a test sensitive or infectious
animal is detected by the SICCT test
Uniform[40− 80%]
Ωs
probability that a test sensitive or infectious
animal is detected at abattoir
Uniform[50− 99%]
ζS increased infectiousness of superspreaders Uniform[1, 1000]
PS proportion of individuals that are superspreaders Uniform[1× 10−3, 0.4]
ζH increase of β in herds with high β Uniform[1, 1000]
PH proportion of herds with high β Uniform[1× 10−3, 0.4]
α external force of infection Uniform[1× 10−10, 5× 10−3]
Table 2: Summary of the priors used in the model.
For σ, γ,Ωr,Ωs the priors were chosen on the basis of existing field and experimental estimates [12]
[11], non-informative priors were used for all other parameters. The rate exposed cattle become test
sensitive and test sensitive cattle become infectious is the inverse of the exposed and test sensitive
periods (6hours− 100days and 4months− 9months) respectively.
Results
1. Development and analysis of locations of HRAs and TAs
Identification of HRAs
The sequential aggregation of ranked quadrats into putative set of HRAs shows an increased model
likelihood with no fluctuations. Figure 7 shows that the implementation of the new ordering method
eliminated the fluctuations originated by the old method of aggregating quadrats (blue and red
lines). The green line shows that just one iteration is necessary to correctly order the quadrats
showing a decrease in accuracy when implemented a series of three iterations.
Beyond the maximum-likelihood value, likelihoods typically declined at a lower rate per quadrat,
compared to the initial increase in likelihood up to the maximum. This shows that, while HRAs
are very well defined, there is higher uncertainty in identifying what areas are not HRA, possibly
because these usually contain fewer breakdowns due to an inherit lower incidence and because

















































































Figure 7: Aggregated likelihood statistics for the three different genotypes: S9:b (top), S10:a
(middle) and S25:a (bottom). The different lines represent 1) the older method of aggregating the
quadrats (blue line: old); 2) the newer method of aggregating the quadrats (red line: new), and 3)
a repetition of three series of the newer method (green: series3). Results for the years 2003 (left)
and 2007 (right) are shown for the different genotypes.
Identification of TAs
Transitional areas were defined for each spoligotype as quadrats that that have been intermittently
high risk during the period 2003-2007 and that are high risk in 2007. The map in Figure 8 shows the
spatial position of herds located in the areas identified as transitional for all the three spoligotypes.
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Figure 8: Map showing herds located in transitional areas for the spoligotypes S9b, S10a, and
S25a. A transitional area for each spoligotype was defined as the set of quadrats that became
infected or became cleared of infection during the study period 2003-2007.
2. Statistical analysis of underlying risk factors for breakdowns in areas of different risk
The continuing expansion of high-incidence areas of bTB in GB raises a number of questions
concerning the determinants of infection at the herd level that are driving the spread of the disease.
Here, we develop risk factor models to understand which risk factors can better predict bTB
breakdowns, and to quantify the importance of different risk factors, such as herd sizes, herd type,
imputed badger densities and cattle movements.
2.1. Risk factors as predictors of bTB breakdowns in Scotland and LRA England
In order to understand if movements from HRAs are good predictors of bTB breakdowns in Scot-
land and in LRA England and how these areas differ from each other, we ran different risk ratings
for herds as stump classifiers for different thresholds (as described in Methods). These were com-
pared with bTB breakdowns and we recorded the number of true and false positives.
Figure 9: ROC curves from all runs of the stump classifier in LRA England (red), Scotland (blue)
and the entire United Kingdom (green).
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Figure 9 shows that by incorporating risk ratings in our analyses, our prediction of breakdowns
was improved in the three areas of study. Since LRA England curves are more concentrated on
the upper left side of the graph, our prediction of breakdowns in LRA England using movements
as risk factors is better than in Scotland or in the rest of the UK.
2.2. Statistical analysis of underlying risk factors for breakdowns in LRAs, HRAs and
TAs
The use of stump classifiers allow us to rapidly evaluate the role of different movement types as
risk factors for spread, and broadly speaking showed us that movements from HRAs to LRAs in
England were a good (better than random) predictor of risk. In order to compare to the previous
work in analysing risk factors in Scotland, we then used a regression-based statistical analysis, as
in [12] for a more detailed analysis including non-movement risk factors.
We compared the significance of the different risk factors in LRAs, HRAs and TAs (as determined
by long term parish testing interval consistency for LRAs and HRAs and by simulation results for
TAs, respectively).
Predictor Unit Odds (95% CIs) Z value Pr(>|Z|)
Intercept 3.948 < 0.001
x-coordinate x/100000 0.010 (0.003, 0.040) -6.565 < 0.001
y-coordinate y/100000 0.094 (0.046, 0.191) -6.536 < 0.001
Herd type Other 1
Fattening 2.127 (1.293, 3.501) 2.971 < 0.001
Herd Size 0-9 1
10-99 0.839 (0.367, 1.921) -0.414 0.346
≥ 100 3.445 (1.749, 6.784) 3.577 < 0.001
Movements from HRAs 0 1
1-10 1.407 (0.883, 2.243) 1.436 0.145
> 10 4.203 (2.503, 7.058) 5.430 < 0.001
Irish imports No 1
Yes 6.248 (4.133, 9.445) 8.691 < 0.001
x*y 1.851 (1.518, 2.258) 6.075 < 0.001
Table 3: Risk factor model for Scotland during the period between 2002 and 2008.
Predictor Unit Odds (95% CIs) Z value Pr(>|Z|)
Intercept 0 (0.000, 0.000) -27.292 <0.000
Herd type Beef 1
Dairy 0.577 (0.359, 0.926) -2.277 0.023
Stores 1.061 (0.621, 1.810) 0.216 0.829
Suckler 0.423 (0.264, 0.679) -3.565 <0.001
Finishing 1.263 (0.851, 1.876) 1.158 0.247
Herd size 1-50 1
51-100 2.813 (1.594, 4.962) 3.570 <0.001
101-200 4.237 (2.484, 7.225) 5.302 <0.001
201-350 4.489 (2.497, 8070 ) 5.019 <0.001
351-500 10.238 (5.500, 19.057) 7.337 <0.001
>500 11.509 (6.324, 20.945) 7.997 <0.001
Batches from HRAs 0 1
1-10 3.586 (2.555, 5.032) 7.387 <0.001
> 10 12.444 (7.983, 19.399) 11.130 <0.001
Table 4: Risk factor model for LRA in England during the period between 2002 and 2008.
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Risk factors for LRAs in England in 2002-2008 are presented in Table 4. Of the variables considered
in this analysis, herd type, herd size and batches from HRAs were shown to have any significance.
The risk of detecting a bTB infection in dairy, stores and finishing herds was not significantly
different from beef herds, while the results suggest that suckler herds have a protective effect
(Odds: 0.423). Herds larger than 50 were at greater risk than those under 50, with herds with
51-100 animals being 2.81 times more likely to have a breakdown. This increased to 4.24, 4.49,
10.24 and 11.50 for 101-200, 201-350, 351-500 and > 500 respectively. The number of batches from
HRAs were considered a risk, where herds that received between 1 and 10 batches per year are 3.59
times more likely to have a breakdown than the ones that did not receive animals from high risk
areas. This value increased to 12.44 when herds import more than 10 batches a year. This result
is consistent with the results from the stump classifier analysis (Figure 9), where cattle movements
were considered a good predictor of risk.
Risk factors for LRAs of England in 2008-2013 are presented in Table 5. Of the variables considered
in this analysis, herd type, herd size, number of batches from HRAs, imports from Ireland and
interactions between imputed badger density and herd type were shown to have any significance.
An interaction between herd type and imputed badger density was significant, meaning that a beef
herd in a badger high density area was at increased risk for bTB (Odds=3.57), while dairy herds in
the same area were less likely to contract the infection (Odds=0.10). The remaining interactions
with imputed badger density and herd type were shown not significant. Similar to the earlier time
period, herds larger than 100 animals were increasingly, and more dramatically, associated with
having confirmed bTB reactors. Herds with 101-200, 201-350, 351-500 and >500 were 6.04, 9.68,
15.01 and 20.48 times more likely to have a breakdown, respectively. While still above the threshold
of statistical significant, the associated confidence intervals suggest a great deal of uncertainty with
the aforementioned Odds.
Predictor Unit Odds (95% CIs) Z value Pr(>|Z|)
Intercept 0 0 -20.680 <0.001
Herd type Beef 1
Dairy 0.830 (0.397, 1.732) -0.497 0.619
Stores 1.571 (0.676, 3.653) 1.050 0.294
Suckler 1.578 (0.842, 2.956) 1.423 0.155
Finishing 1.883 (0.978, 3.627) 1.893 0.058
Badger density Rescaled 3.566 (0.913, 13.932) 1.829 0.067
Herd size 1-50 1
51-100 3.952 (1.800, 8.676) 3.425 0.001
101-200 6.042 (2.866, 12.735) 4.728 <0.001
201-350 9.680 (4.523, 20.717) 5.848 <0.001
351-500 15.014 (6.617, 34.065) 6.481 <0.001
>500 20.476 (9.415, 44.530) 7.617 <0.001
Batches from HRAs 1 0
1-10 2.837 (1.864, 4.317) 4.868 <0.001
> 10 11.985 (7.218, 19.899) 9.601 <0.001
Imports from Ireland False 1
True 2.253 (1.306, 3.887) 2.918 0.004
Interactions Badger-Beef 1
Badger-Dairy 0.099 (0.020, 0.498) -2.806 0.005
Badger-Finishing 0.791 (0.153, 4.084) -0.280 0.779
Badger-Stores 0.769 (0.092, 6.458) -0.242 0.809
Badger-Suckler 0.299 (0.066, 1.344) -1.575 0.115
Table 5: Risk factor model for LRA in England and Wales during the period between 2008 and
2013.
Risk factors for HRAs in England and Wales in 2002-2008 are presented in Table 6. Unlike
LRAs during the same time period, herd type and herd size were the only significant risk factors
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in predicting confirmed bTB reactors. Only dairy and finishing herds were more risky when
compared to beef herds (Odds=0.99 and 1.96, respectively), while stores and suckler herds were
not significantly different from beef herds. Herds with more than 50 animals where shown to be
more risky than herds with less than 50 animals, where more than 500 animals were shown to be
only 6.55 times more risky, though this is not significantly different from the Odds corresponding
to the 351-500 animals category.
Predictor Unit Odds (95% CIs) Z value Pr(>|Z|)
Intercept 0.045 (0.037, 0.055) -31.826 <0.000
Herd type Beef 1
Dairy 0.989 (0.919, 1.065) -0.281 <0.001
Stores 0.904 (0.800, 1.020) -1.637 0.102
Suckler 0.981 (0.911, 1.057) -0.497 0.619
Finishing 1.965 (1.345, 2.872) 3.490 <0.001
Herd size 1-50 1
51-100 2.530 (2.330, 2.746) 22.194 <0.001
101-200 3.933 (3.641, 4.249) 34.787 <0.001
201-350 5.691 (5.231, 6.191 ) 40.472 <0.001
351-500 7.239 (6.479, 8.089) 34.978 <0.001
>500 6.548 (5.824, 7.362) 31.438 <0.001
Table 6: Risk factor model for HRA in England during the period between 2002 and 2008.
Risk factors for HRAs in England and Wales in 2008-2013 are presented in Table 7. Herd type,
herd size and number of batches from high risk areas were the only significant risk factors in
predicting confirmed bTB reactors. Similar to the earlier time period in HRAs, finishing herds
were significantly associated with an increase in a breakdown (Odds=1.17). Increases in herd size
over 50 were associated with increased risk, where more than 500 animals were shown to be only
5.82 times more risky, though this is not significantly different from the Odds corresponding to
the 351-500 animals category (just like in the previous study period). Herds with 51-100, 101-200,
201-350, 351-500 and over 500 animals were 2.52, 3.78, 5.50, 7.02 and 6.36 times more likely to have
a breakdown when compared to herds with 1-50 animals. The results related to cattle movements
suggest that receiving animals from herds in already high risk areas does not increase the risk of
bTB (Odds=0.54).
Predictor Unit Odds (95% CIs) Z value Pr(> |Z|)
Intercept 0.030 (0.023, 0.040) -24.518 <0.001
Herd type Beef 1
Dairy 1.001 (0.943, 1.062) 0.036 0.971
Stores 0.992 (0.905, 1.088) -0.166 0.868
Suckler 1.017 (0.958, 1.079) 0.548 0.583
Finishing 1.166 (1.091, 1.247) 4.499 <0.001
Herd size 1-50 1
51-100 2.523 (2.378, 2.677) 30.592 <0.001
101-200 3.785 (3.577, 4.004) 46.338 <0.001
201-350 5.495 (5.163, 5.847) 53.678 <0.001
351-500 7.016 (6.479, 7.597) 47.986 <0.001
>500 6.364 (5.875, 6.892) 45.433 <0.001
Batches from HRAs 0 1
1-10 0.540 (0.450, 0.647) -6.652 <0.001
> 10 0.735 (0.547, 0.988) -2.042 0.041
Table 7: Risk factor model for HRA in England between 2008 and 2013.
The risk factors for the TAs are presented in Table 8.
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Predictor Unit Odds (95% CIs) Z value Pr(> |Z|)
Intercept 0.014 ( 0.008, 0.024) -15.7798 <0.001
Herd size 1-50 1
51-100 2.989 (2.368, 3.775) 9.205 <0.001
101-200 5.066 (4.097, 6.264) 14.978 <0.001
201-350 8.179 (6.558, 10.202) 18.640 <0.001
351-500 10.015 (97.533, 13.3150) 15.855 <0.001
>500 10.778 (7.946, 14.619) 15.287 <0.001
Batches from HRAs 0 1
1-10 0.627 (0.528, 0.744) -5.326 <0.001
> 10 0.732 (0.516, 1.038) -1.753 0.080
Table 8: Risk factor model for TA in England between 2003 and 2007.
Herds with 51-100 animals were 2.99 times more likely to have a breakdown, with 101-200 animals
and 201-350 animals being 5.07 and 8.18 times more risky. This value increased to 10.02 times the
risk of herds with 351-500 animals when compared to small herds 1-50 animals. herds with >500
animals (Odds=10.78) do not seem to be significantly more risky than herds with 351-500 animals.
Just like in HRAs for the study period 2008-2013, the number of batches received from high risk
areas do not seem to increase the risk of infection.
Each risk factor model included herd type (except for TAs) and herd size as significant risk factors
for herd level prevalence of M. bovis infection, however, no particular herd type was consistently
risky. This may reflect differences in the sample size of each farm type in the study areas as opposed
to regional variation in the riskiness of farming practices for different herd types. Previous risk
factor assessments in LRAs of Great Britain have highlighted movements from HRAs of England
and Wales as well as imports from Northern and the Republic of Ireland ([19]). Movements from
high risk areas were identified as significant risk factors in low risk areas for both study periods, in
the later period of high risk areas and in transitional areas. While in low risk areas, these increase
the risk of getting infected, in high risk areas it seems that they are not relevant, since the herds
are already at a higher risk of infection. The influence of cattle movements from high risk areas
into transitional areas also seems to play a very minor role. More research on the expansion of
transitional areas needs to be done to better understand the causes associated with spatial increase
of infection. The discrepancy of the identified risk factors across the different incidence areas may
be a product of the more conservative model fitting selection criteria or possible relationships
between the different factors that can mask the contribution of movements from HRAS.
The statistical results suggesting that imputed badger density is a significant risk factor in low
incidence areas but not in high incidence areas bears some comment given the known epidemiology
of the disease. The herd-level prevalence of infection in low incidence areas calculated from the
model considering estimated main badger sett density exclusively suggests geographical clustering
of areas with high estimated density of setts, with areas adjacent to the high incidence areas more
likely to contract the infection. It is therefore possible that this risk factor may be a proxy for
other geographically localised correlates. Figures 10, 11, and 12 show how badger sett density
(provided by APHA) is related with herd size in areas of different risk (LRAs and HRAs) and for
two different study periods (2003-2008 and 2009-2013).
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Figure 10: Smooth scatter plots of the mean imputed badger density versus herd sizes for LRA
England during the periods 2003-2008 and 2009-2013.
Figure 11: Fitted value for imputed badger density in mixed regression model for LRA England
during the periods 2003-2008 and 2009-2013.
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Figure 12: Smooth scatter plots of the mean imputed badger density versus herd sizes for HRA
England during the periods 2003-2008 and 2009-2013.
Figure 13: Fitted value for imputed badger density in mixed regression model for HRA England
during the periods 2003-2008 and 2009-2013.
Further, in order to facilitate fitting estimated main badger sett density to the models as described
above, the data required normalisation, a process carried out on both the 2002-2008 and 2008-
2013 low and high incidence datasets individually. It is possible that this transformation could
accentuate the differences in estimated density values, giving the impression of a greater range
then the original national data suggest and overemphasising any statistical relationship found.
Complications with interpreting the results may also arise from fitting rescaled imputed badger
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density to a model without consideration of the practical range in values. The inclusion of imputed
badger density and herd type interactions in the 2008-2013 low incidence risk factor analysis may
nevertheless be indicative of a relationship masked in the 2002-2008 dataset. However, even though
the earlier dataset is much larger and more geographically diverse, a further investigation into the
relationship between the different herds and areas of high imputed badger density may help in
understanding a potentially emerging risk factor. This outcome, while resulting in a model that
best fits the data, may be merely a result of correlates to imputed badger density estimation
(detailed above) and imputed badger density transformation to permit model fitting, rather than
density of badgers themselves.
3. Application of the Scottish risk-based surveillance model to long term quadrennial
testing areas to reduce testing. Currently, Scotland has implemented a surveillance system
based on work by Bessell et al. [12] and all eligible herds in LRA England are tested once every 4
years under the routine herd testing (RHT) policy. RHT is supplemented by further whole herd
tests, triggered by post-movement testing of cattle moving from HRA England, from Wales or
Ireland and contact tracing following a confirmed breakdown for Scotland (2003-2008) (Table 9),
for LRA England (2003-2008) (Table 10), and for LRA England (2009-2013) (Table11). The type
of tests shown for Scotland are similar to the ones presented by Bessell et al. [12], while we
have explored a few more for LRAs Englands shown in Tables 10 and 11. These show that most
confirmed breakdowns have been detected due to slaughterhouse, tracing and WHT tests (either













RHT Whole 20580 21 1241389 46 22
Tracing Part 2984 18 8393 76 22
Post-movement Part 1650 1 13367 2 0
Post-Irish import Part 1077 9 16402 31 11
Inconclusive reactor retest Part 1530 47 2544 267 54
Table 9: The number of herds and animals tested by different surveillance types in Scotland













Contiguous herd Whole 361 1 37480 3 1
1st hotspot check Whole 35 0 4004 0 0
Pre-Movement Part 1271 0 17780 0 0
RHT Whole 21907 18 1120146 364 31
WHT Whole 1032 1 82522 1 1
Tracing Part 9095 41 30638 72 54
Post-movement Part 275 0 1062 0 0
Post-Irish import Part 169 0 719 0 0
Inconclusive reactor retest Part 2036 19 4909 52 18
Slaughterhouse Part 110 96 0 323 162
Table 10: The number of herds and animals tested by different surveillance types in LRA England














Contiguous herd Whole 420 1 49459 1 1
1st hotspot check Whole 24 0 3269 0 0
Pre-Movement Part 1899 0 26499 3 3
RHT Whole 6069 3 326669 7 4
WHT Whole 697 2 45872 6 2
Tracing Part 6007 36 21182 59 43
Post-movement Part 277 1 972 0 0
Post-Irish import Part 280 4 3321 15 3
Inconclusive reactor retest Part 651 23 1279 78 15
Slaughterhouse Part 163 71 0 104 89
Table 11: The number of herds and animals tested by different surveillance types in LRA England
between 2009 and 2013.
Analysis of the squared root of the mean number of animals sent to slaughter per year during the
periods 2003-2008 (in Scotland and LRA England), and 2009-2013 (in LRA England) against the
squared root of the mean herd size shows a linear relationship with distinct clustering of finishing
and dairy herds (Figure 14). Finishing herds are typically smaller than dairy herds, however, they
have more per capita movements to slaughter compared to dairy herds.
Figure 14: Scatterplots showing the squared root of mean herd size per herd against the squared
root of the mean number of animals moved to slaughter in Scotland (top left), LRA England (top
right) during 2003-2008, and LRA England (bottom) during 2009-2013 broken down by herd type
as listed in SAM’s database. The axes have been truncated for clarity. There is a linear relationship
between herd size and number of movements to slaughter with distinct clustering of finishing and
dairy herds. Albeit dairy herds are larger, they have fewer per capita movements to slaughter
compared to fattening herds.
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For a comparison of alternative surveillance scenarios, we applied the scenarios defined in [12]
(based upon identifying herds that are more likely to be infected and not detected) to Scotland
during 2003-2008, and we applied the eight scenarios defined in the Methods section to the LRA
England during the time periods 2003-2008 and 2009-2013. A multi-based risk is examined here-
after. Results of the four baseline scenarios - Slaughterhouse only, Four year, Two year and One
year surveillance models applied to Scotland and LRA England during 2003-2008 and to LRA
England during 2009-2013 are presented in Figures 15 and summarized in Tables 12, 13, and 14.
Figure 15 shows the cumulative distribution plots of the probability of each herd harbouring unde-
tected infection at the end of each model time step for Scotland 2003-2008 (top left), LRA England
2003-2008 (top right), and LRA England 2009-2013 (bottom). There is a small percentage of herds
that have a very low probability of undetected infection, and that the probability of undetected
infection varies with the different testing regimes adopted. As expected, slaughterhouse surveil-
lance allows for the largest proportion of herds to have a higher probability of undetected infection,
followed by the four-year and all the risk-based scenarios, and lastly by the one-year and two-year
testing scenarios, in which large proportion of herds have at most a very low probability of unde-
tected infection. As an example, with slaughterhouse surveillance only, around 90% of the herds
have a probability of undetected infection of at most 0.011, 0.010 and 0.012 for, respectively Scot-
land, LRA England 2003-2008 and England 2009-2013; with four-year testing, the same percentage
of herds have a probability lower than 0.004 per herd in all three areas, while if the frequency of
testing is increased in England for one-year or two-year testing, the probability is at most 0.003
for two-year testing and at most 0.001 for one-year testing for both study periods in England.
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Figure 15: Cumulative distribution plot of the probability of each herd harbouring undetected
infection at the end of each model time step for all herds in Scotland (top left) and in LRA
England (top right) during 2003-2008, and LRA England during 2009-2013 (bottom) from the
three baseline models. The ’Slaughterhouse only’ scenario represents a minimal model (the lowest
amount of surveillance that could be under) and the ’Annual routine herd testing’ scenario is
the maximal model (the most surveillance that could be undertaken under the current testing
regimens). The remaining four (top left)) and eight scenarios (top right) and bottom)) are the
four- and eight- risk based surveillance systems used, respectively in Scotland and in LRA England.
The x-axis has been truncated for clarity.
Regarding the risk-based surveillance scenarios, 90% of the herds will have a probability between
0.004 and 0.006, in which the better and similar scenarios have a lower probability than the lower
detection scenarios (Scotland 2003-2008). For LRA England 2003-2008, 90% of the herds have at
most probability between 0.004 and 0.006 per herd for all eight surveillance scenarios. Scenarios
1-2 and 7-8 have very similar curves and have lower probabilities of undetected infection per herd
than Scenarios 5-6. These patterns hold for all extra scenarios in LRA England 09-13, however,
the probability values vary between 0.004 and 0.007, suggesting that there is a slight increase in
















Slaughterhouse only n.a 0 0 86.70 54.54 48.26 0
Current 4 2859 438854 106.47 20.51 21.27 62.96
Maximum 1 11437 1755418 107.20 2.72 2.95 253.95
Risk-based surveillance
Better 2/4 2292 352454 107.36 19.99 21.00 51.10
Similar 4 2138 309040 106.08 21.40 22.06 46.55
Lower Detection 1 4 1667 200405 104.30 23.88 24.03 34.82
Lower Detection 2 1/2/4 1912 396516 104.18 24.51 24.56 46.48























Slaughterhouse n.a 0 0 139.83 76.50 84.57 0.00 0.00
Four year 4 4891 554723 160.96 30.81 30.71 107.95 105.19
Two year 2 9782 1109446 158.73 15.02 15.48 215.78 213.30
One year 1 19564 2218893 153.96 4.69 5.22 432.62 422.07
Risk-based surveillance
Scenario 1 2/4 4262 490551 163.30 29.54 28.80 94.07 90.77
Scenario 2 4 3729 408355 160.41 32.26 32.35 81.47 80.53
Scenario 3 4 2823 287405 157.95 35.73 36.49 61.20 60.44
Scenario 4 1/2/4 3301 534062 155.75 38.06 39.37 80.75 79.98
Scenario 5 1/2/4 1811 271122 150.55 44.17 47.29 40.90 41.53
Scenario 6 1/2/4 1654 205482 149.96 44.68 48.03 35.39 33.82
Scenario 7 1/4 5427 765500 161.58 30.02 29.71 124.85 123.03
Scenario 8 1/4 5173 732626 161.44 30.34 30.12 117.55 115.33
























Slaughterhouse n.a 0 0 116.85 85.52 91.11 0.00 0.00
Four year 4 3234 391590 145.15 30.89 26.89 71.41 69.44
Two year 2 6469 783181 142.83 14.52 12.06 143.24 138.69
One year 1 12939 1566363 136.70 4.20 3.52 286.86 279.15
Risk-based surveillance
Scenario 1 2/4 3064 369651 147.61 28.42 24.08 67.88 66.26
Scenario 2 4 2531 290557 144.72 32.01 28.03 55.63 55.03
Scenario 3 4 2074 220600 143.25 34.32 30.61 44.95 43.46
Scenario 4 1/2/4 2827 448114 143.47 32.92 29.70 68.49 67.59
Scenario 5 1/2/4 1803 264069 140.03 38.35 35.73 40.92 39.63
Scenario 6 1/2/4 1682 213142 139.62 38.90 36.33 36.72 35.75
Scenario 7 1/4 3626 556163 145.70 29.95 25.89 84.21 82.50
Scenario 8 1/4 3486 570642 145.44 30.41 26.42 79.58 77.94
Table 14: Summary of test results for LRA England (2009-2013).
According to Tables 13 and 14, slaughterhouse surveillance alone detects fewer breakdowns than
the four-year baseline scenario (140 compared to 161 in 2003-2008; 117 compared to 144 in 2009-
2013) and presents a higher number of latent infections per year (76 compared to 31 in 2003-2008;
86 compared to 31 in 2009-2013). The two-year baseline scenario detects a similar number of
breakdowns as the four-year one (159 compared to 161 in 2003-2008; 143 compared to 145 in
2009-2013), fewer latent infections per year (15 compared to 31 in 2003-2008; 14 compared to 31 in
2009-2013), but presents more false positives (216 compared to 108 false positives in 2003-2008; 143
compared to 71 false positives in 2009-2013), and more herds tested (9782 compared to 4891 herds
tested in 2003-2008; 6469 compared to 3234 herds tested in 2009-2013). The one-year baseline
scenario detects slightly fewer breakdowns than the four-year one (154 compared to 161 in 2003-
2008; 137 compared to 145 in 2009-2013), fewer latent infections per year (5 compared to 31 in
2003-2008; 4 compared to 27 in 2009-2013), but with many more false positives (433 compared to
108 false positives in 2003-2008; 287 compared to 71 false positives in 2009-2013) and a substantial
increase of herds tested (19564 compared to 4891 in 2003-2008; 12939 compared to 3234 herds
tested in 2009-2013).
Regarding the different risk-based surveillance scenarios, Scenarios 1-2 detect a very similar num-
ber of breakdowns as the four-year regime (163 and 160 compared to 161 in 2003-2008; 144 and
143 compared to 144 in 2009-2013), a very similar number of latent infections per year (30 and 32
compared to 31 in 2003-2008; 36 and 37 compared to 35 in 2009-2013), and a fewer number of false
positives (94 and 81 compared to 108 in 2003-2008; 59 and 55 compared to 73 in 2009-2013), for
fewer herds tested (4262 and 3729 compared to 4891 in 2003-2008; 2743 and 2549 compared to 3347
in 2009-2013). Scenarios 3-6 present similar patterns between them: fewer herds tested than the
four-year baseline scenario (2823, 3301, 1811 and 1654 compared to 4891 in 2003-2008; 2074, 2827,
1803, 1682 compared to 3234 in 2009-2013), fewer breakdowns detected (158, 156, 151 and 150
compared to 161 in 2003-2008; 143, 143, 140, 140 compared to 145 in 2009-2013), higher number of
latent infections (36, 38, 44 and 45 compared to 31 in 2003-2008; 34, 33, 38, 39 compared to 31 in
2009-2013), and a lower number of false positives (61, 81, 41 and 35 compared to 108 in 2003-2008;
45, 68, 41, 37 compared to 71 in 2009-2013). Finally, Scenarios 7 and 8 detect a similar number
of breakdowns as the four-year scenario (162 and 161 compared to 161 in 2003-2008; 146 and 145
compared to 145 in 2009-2013), have a similar number of latent infections (30 in both scenarios
compared to 31 in 2003-2008; 30 in both scenarios compared to 31 in 2009-2013), present a higher
number of false positives (136 and 120 compared to 111 in 2003-2008; 84 and 80 compared to 71
in 2009-2013), and test additional herds (5427 and 5173 compared to 4891 in 2003-2008; 3626 and





No. herds (%) bTB (RHT)∗
Better
Slaughtering < 25% of stock +1
0 points=no
testing
2825 (24.7) 30 (2)
1 point=4 year
testing
8056 (70.4) 50 (10)
Receiving ’high risk’ animals
in > 3 years and slaughtering




556 (4.9) 17 (4)
Similar
Slaughtering < 25% of stock
and/or receiving ’high risk’
animals in > 3 years and




2886 (25.2) 33 (2)
1 point=4 year
testing
8551 (25.2) 64 (14)
Lower Detection 1
Slaughtering < 12.5% of stock
and/or receiving ’high risk’
animals in > 3 years and




4770 (41.7) 54 (5)
1 point=4 year
testing
6667 (58.3) 43 (11)
Lower Detection 2




5064 (44.3) 19 (2)
Slaughtering < 5% of stock +1
1 point=4 year
testing
5241 (45.8) 58 (7)
Receiving ’high risk’ animals




1060 (9.3) 19 (7)
Having > 100 animals +1
3 points =
annual testing
72 (0.6) 1 (0)
Table 15: Composition of the risk-based surveillance scenarios for Scotland between 2003 and
2008. BTB, bovine Tuberculosis; RHT, Routine Herd Testing. BtB is the number of confirmed
breakdowns between 2003 and 2008 that fell into that category. *RHT represents the breakdowns
that were detected by RHT.
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Criteria Points Testing interval No. of herds (%) bTB RHT WHT SLH Other
Scenario 1
Slaughtering < 25% of stock +1 0 points=no testing 4408 (22.5) 109 5 0 73 31
Receiving ’high risk’ animals
in > 3 years and slaughtering
< 50% of stock
1 point=4 year
testing




1895 (9.7) 18 4 0 6 8
Scenario 2
Slaughtering < 25% of stock
and/or receiving ’high risk’
animals in > 3 years and
slaughtering < 40% of stock
1 0 points=no testing 4646 (23.7) 117 5 0 79 33
1 point=4 year
testing
14918 (76.3) 68 16 2 21 29
Scenario 3
Slaughtering < 12.5% of
stock and/or receiving ’high
risk’ animals in > 3 years and
slaughtering < 25% of stock
1 0 points=no testing 8269 (42.3) 145 11 1 86 47
1 point=4 year
testing
11295 (57.7) 40 10 1 14 15
Scenario 4
Slaughtering > 25% of stock -1
-1 or 0 points=no
testing
8805 (45) 43 5 1 17 20
Slaughtering < 5% of stock +1
1 point=4 year
testing
8724 (44.6) 126 11 1 77 37
Receiving ’high risk’ animals




1830 (9.4) 15 4 0 6 5
Having > 100 animals +1
3 points=annual
testing
205 (1) 1 1 0 0 0
Scenario 5
Slaughtering > 25% of stock -1
-1 or 0 points=no
testing
13101 (67) 114 13 2 55 44
Slaughtering < 5% of stock +1
1 point=4 year
testing
5722 (29.2) 65 6 0 42 17
Receiving ’high risk’ animals




721 (3.7) 5 1 0 3 1
Having > 350 animals +1
3 points=annual
testing
20 (0.1) 1 1 0 0 0
Scenario 6
Slaughtering > 25% of stock -1
-1 or 0 points=no
testing
13590 (69.5) 129 13 2 67 47
Slaughtering < 5% of stock +1
1 point=4 year
testing
5349 (27.3) 54 7 0 33 14
Receiving ’high risk’ animals




616 (3.1) 1 0 0 0 1
Having > 500 animals +1
3 points=annual
testing
9 (0) 1 1 0 0 0
Scenario 7
≤ 350 animals 1 1 point=4 year
testing




715 (3.7) 25 4 0 17 4
Scenario 8
≤ 500 animals 1 1 point=4 year
testing




376 (1.9) 26 1 0 20 5
Table 16: Composition of the risk-based surveillance scenarios for LRA England (2003-2008). The
testing interval column represents the time frame of the bTB testing, which depends on the level
of risk based on a score point system (0=no testing, 1=4 year testing, 2=2 year testing, 3=annual
testing). The No. of herds column corresponds to the number of herds (and percentage of the
total number of herds) that fell into each testing interval category. bTB is the number of confirmed
breakdowns between 2003 and 2008. RHT, WHT, and SLH are the breakdowns that were detected
by routine-herd testing, whole-herd testing and slaughterhouse, respectively.
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Criteria Points Testing interval No. of herds (%) bTB RHT WHT SLH Other
Scenario 1
Slaughtering < 25% of stock +1 0 points=no testing 2632 (20.3) 93 1 1 62 29
Receiving ’high risk’ animals
in > 3 years and slaughtering
< 50% of stock
1 point=4 year
testing




1951 (15.1) 19 4 1 5 9
Scenario 2
Slaughtering < 25% of stock
and/or receiving ’high risk’
animals in > 3 years and
slaughtering < 40% of stock
1 0 points=no testing 2815 (21.8) 94 1 1 62 30
1 point=4 year
testing
10124 (78.2) 52 8 1 17 26
Scenario 3
Slaughtering < 12.5% of
stock and/or receiving ’high
risk’ animals in > 3 years and
slaughtering < 25% of stock
1 0 points=no testing 4642 (35.9) 106 2 1 68 35
1 point=4 year
testing
8297 (64.1) 40 7 1 11 21
Scenario 4
Slaughtering > 25% of stock -1
-1 or 0 points=no
testing
4523 (35) 27 2 0 13 12
Slaughtering < 5% of stock +1
1 point=4 year
testing
6164 (47.6) 101 4 1 62 34
Receiving ’high risk’ animals




1932 (14.9) 14 3 1 4 6
Having > 100 animals +1
3 points=annual
testing
320 (2.5) 4 0 0 0 4
Scenario 5
Slaughtering > 25% of stock -1
-1 or 0 points=no
testing
6827 (52.8) 72 3 0 38 31
Slaughtering < 5% of stock +1
1 point=4 year
testing
5074 (39.2) 67 6 2 41 18
Receiving ’high risk’ animals




1007 (7.8) 7 0 0 0 7
Having > 350 animals +1
3 points=annual
testing
31 (0.2) 0 0 0 0 0
Scenario 6
Slaughtering > 25% of stock -1
-1 or 0 points=no
testing
7159 (55.3) 89 4 0 50 35
Slaughtering < 5% of stock +1
1 point=4 year
testing
4857 (37.5) 50 5 2 29 14
Receiving ’high risk’ animals




910 (7) 7 0 0 0 7
Having > 500 animals +1
3 points=annual
testing
13 (0.1) 0 0 0 0 0
Scenario 7
≤ 350 animals 1 1 point=4 year
testing




522 (4) 22 1 0 14 7
Scenario 8
≤ 500 animals 1 1 point=4 year
testing




335 (2.6) 36 1 1 23 11
Table 17: Composition of the risk-based surveillance scenarios for LRA England (2009-2013). The
testing interval column represents the time frame of the bTB testing, which depends on the level
of risk based on a score point system (0=no testing, 1=4 year testing, 2=2 year testing, 3=annual
testing). The No. of herds column corresponds to the number of herds (and percentage of the
total number of herds) that fell into each testing interval category. bTB is the number of confirmed
breakdowns between 2009 and 2013. RHT, WHT, and SLH are the breakdowns that were detected
by routine-herd testing, whole-herd testing and slaughterhouse, respectively.
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Tables 16 and 17 represent the composition of the risk-based surveillances where the testing interval
is determined by the level of risk based on a score point system (0=no testing, 1=4 year testing,
2=2 year testing, 3=annual testing). However, scenarios 7-8, by definition, require the testing of
additional herds, since they do not allow herds with high probability of freedom from the disease
to be exempt from testing. In these scenarios, only herd size was accounted as a risk factor and all
the herds below a certain threshold value (scenario 7 : ≤ 350, scenario 8 : ≤ 500) are tested every
four years, while the ones above the threshold are tested every year. Tables 16 and 17 show that
scenarios 1-3 would have identified, respectively, 16, 16 and 10 out of 21 breakdowns that were
identified by RHT for 2003-2008 and 8, 8 and 7 out of 9 for 2009-2013. While scenarios 4-6 would
have identified 16, 8 and 8, respectively, out of 21 breakdowns identified by RHT for 2003-2008,
and 7, 6 and 5 out of 9 for 2009-2013. Scenarios 7-9 would have identified all the breakdowns
detected by RHT since all the herds are tested.
Factors for risk-based models
The characteristics of herds that have a low probability of freedom from slaughterhouse surveil-
lance alone were analysed in order to identify the types of herd that require more surveillance. The
following are analysed in relation to the probability of freedom from slaughterhouse surveillance
only considering: 1) herd size; 2) herd type; 3) proportion of herds that is slaughtered; 3) receiving
animals from HRAs either directly or indirectly.
When plotted against the probability of freedom of infection following slaughterhouse only surveil-
lance, herds that slaughter a smaller proportion of their stock have a lower probability of freedom
(Figure 16) for the different 3 scenarios. In LRA England, finishing herds (red dots) are the ones
that send higher proportion of their stock to slaughter, while dairy (blue dots) and suckler (yellow
dots) herds are the ones that send less. Dairy herds have a much higher probability of freedom
from infection than any other type.
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Figure 16: Plot of the ratio of slaughtered animals to probability of freedom from infection in
Scotland (2003) (top left), in LRA England (2003), and in LRA (2009) (bottom). The axes on
these plots have been truncated to ease interpretation.
To study which of the herd types have higher probability of freedom from infection, in this anal-
ysis, we will break down the probability of freedom by farm type according to SAM’s database
(Figure 17).
Figure 17: Boxplot of probability of freedom from the slaughterhouse only model for Scotland (top
left), LRA England (top right) during 2002-2008, and LRA England during 2009-2013 (bottom)
by herd type. Box widths represent the proportion of data in that category. The y-axis has been
truncated for clarity.
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Whilst not a particular risk group for acquiring infection, these figures show that the probability
of freedom from infection is lower for suckler and store herds than for other herd types, for LRA
England (2009-2013), while for Scotland and LRA England (2003-2008) the probability of freedom
from infection is lower for suckler and store, respectively.
The width of the boxplots represent the number of herds that fit into each category. In Scotland
(upper left), there are more beef herds (followed by suckler, dairy, fattening and stores), while in
LRA England for 2003-2008, there are more suckler herds (followed by beef and dairy, fattening and
lastly stores). In LRA England during 2009-2013, suckler herds continue to be the most abundant,
however, beef, dairy and fattening herds are very close in number, followed by stores.
Figure 18: Scatterplot of the farm size categories by probability of freedom from slaughterhouse
only surveillance in Scotland (top left), LRA England (top right) during 2003-2008, and LRA
England (bottom) during 2009-2013. Axes have been truncated for clarity.
Herd size is an important risk factor, and Figure 18 shows that suckler herds are the ones that have
smaller farm sizes and lower probability of freedom from infection (in orange), while dairy herds
(in blue) are the ones that have larger farms and higher probabilities of freedom from infection in
all three scenarios (less evident in Scotland).
An analysis of the number of years in which herds received animals from HRAs shows that the mean
probability of freedom is insensitive to the number of years with high risk imports (see Figure 19).
However, the tails of the distribution seem to be decreasing with the number of years with high risk
imports. These results seem to be counter-intuitive since herds that receive animals from HRAs
are at a higher risk, therefore more work needs to be done on the role of high-risk imports in cattle
herds.
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Figure 19: The probability of freedom by slaughterhouse surveillance in Scotland (top left) and
in LRA England (top right) during 2003-2008, and LRA England (bottom) during 2009-2013, by
the number of years in which animals were bought on to the farm from HRAs. The box widths
represent the relative proportion of data points in each group. The y-axis has been truncated for
clarity.
Figure 20: Herd size density of farms that imported animals from HRAs to Scotland. The number
of years in which animals were bought on to farms from HRAs are separated by colour according
to the legend.
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To check how herd size is related with the number of years in which a farm has high risk imports,
we compute the probability distribution of herd sizes per non-consecutive years of import. We
expect that the longer a farm has been importing animals, the larger is the size of that farm.
In Scotland, farms that import animals for longer periods are also farms that have more animals
(Figure 20). By looking at the distribution of herd types per number of years that farms have been
importing animals, Figure 21 shows that the proportion of herd types is broadly consistent with
the number of importation years, except for beef fattening that increases its proportion when it
has been receiving imports for 7 years.
Figure 21: Herd type proportion of farms that imported animals from high incidence areas in
Scotland. Each pie chart represent the number of years in which animals have been imported from
high incidence areas. Herd types are represent by a different colour (beef:red, fattening:orange,
suckler: yellow, dairy: green, store: violet, and other: purple).
This is further corroborated by the stump classifier models presented in this report, which also
suggest that more precise targeting of movement types shows little benefit. Because volume of
cattle movements is strongly correlated with herd size, it is likely that the importance of cattle
movements is simply masked by this correlation. While the statistical analysis and, therefore, this
result is used to establish the probability of freedom from infection, we emphasise the fundamental
statistical principle that, while the correlation is useful for establishing relative risks, it does not
imply causation. We therefore count cattle movements from high risk areas and from Ireland to
be logical variables to consider in any risk analyses since they are likely to be the most important
factor responsible for carrying infected individuals from herd to herd. Despite this decision, it
does remain important to note the differences found for the risk factors in this study, compared
to others. These differences could be due to the use of more conservative statistical methods, or
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due to hidden relationships with other risk factors like herd size or herd type, masking in this way,
their possible contribution.
We have applied the Scottish risk-based surveillance model developed by [12] to long term qua-
drennials in low risk areas in England.
In this model, four different baseline scenarios were modelled based on the annual time frame for
surveillance (slaughterhouse, four-year, two-year and one-year models, where all have slaughter-
house surveillance together with the corresponding number of testing years). In the context of the
Scottish framework, three risk-based surveillance scenarios were created for the cases that were
identified as requiring fewer animals tests than the current surveillance regime (better, similar and
lower detection surveillance) and evaluated relative to the number of latent infections.
This framework has been extended for LRAs England to incorporate one more baseline scenario
(two-year testing) and four more alternative risk-based surveillance scenarios than the ones used
in the Scottish framework. The strategies developed here provide different balances between the
requirements for disease detection and minimizing surveillance effort, and the efficacy of detecting
infections varies slightly when compared to the current four-year RHT. Eight surveillance scenarios
were created to identify which testing regimes would require fewer animals tests, and fewer number
of both latent infections and false positives in LRA England. The results show that slaughterhouse
surveillance alone results in a large number of latent infections. Therefore, our study shows that
additional active surveillance (via RHT) is necessary. A more frequent testing regime (one or two
years interval) will not help in detecting more breakdowns than the current four year testing. These
scenarios will decrease the mean number of latent infections, but they will increase substantially
the number of false positives and of the number of herds tested.
Surveillance in LRA England can be improved if herds at higher risk are targeted. By exploiting
statistical analyses defining herd level probability of freedom from disease stratified by significant
risk factors, testing frequencies can be refined to test highly probable infections more frequently,
and conversely potentially reducing testing of low risk herds. Of the scenarios developed, scenarios
1-2 and scenarios 7-8, show very similar detection efficacy as the current testing regime and selected
herds for testing based upon the proportion of stock slaughtered, the number of batches of high-risk
animals moving into the farm (scenarios 1-2 ) and upon the herd size (scenarios 7-8 ). Scenarios
4-6 show lower detection efficacy than the current testing regime and included the testing of large
herds (with different cut-off thresholds) as well as those that slaughter fewer animals and import
animals from high-incidence areas. Different temporal windows were investigated in this analysis:
one-, two-, four-year testing, and combinations of the formers. Different solutions emerged from
these testing windows. The results show that if greater detection to achieve freedom than the
current regime were desirable, then testing herds at a greater risk of acquiring infection on a more
regular basis may be beneficial, but at some cost in terms of numbers of herds being tested and
an increase in the number of false positives. As determinants of risk and subsequent detection we
have used herd size, proportion of animals sent to slaughter and movements from high risk areas in
England and Wales, and from both Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland. Two of the systems
presented here require testing herds that slaughter < 25% of stock per year. This ensures that
those herds that would not on average replace their entire stock over a 4-year period are tested for
bTB. Five of the systems require testing herds that have large numbers of cattle. Herd size has
been a known risk factor for bTB and a more frequent testing regime in these herds would improve
detection of disease.
During the periods 2003-2008 and 2009-2013 there were 185 and 146 breakdowns, where 21 and
9 of the cases were identified by RHT, 101 and 79 by slaughterhouse, 2 and 2 by WHT. Despite
comprising only RHT and slaughterhouse surveillance, the model predicts around 161 and 145 of
cases detected for the periods 2003-2008 and 2009-2013, respectively. This is because the remainder
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of the surveillance is made up of other types of testing not made up for here, such as pre- (not
mandatory for LRA in England) and post-movement tests, post-Irish imports, tracings, hotspots
check and contiguous herd tests. These are not included in the model, however, it still allows for
some of their detection indirectly at slaughterhouse or by RHT of those that would occur later in
time. Of the eight scenarios developed for LRA England, there were three scenarios that produced
similar levels of surveillance (the mean number of latently infected herds is within 5% of the current
surveillance) for fewer herds tested (Scenario 1) and for additional herds tested (scenarios 7-8 ),
and five scenarios that produced up to 15% lower surveillance (scenarios 2-6 ). Despite this, they
can offer different advantages. For 2009-2013, Scenarios 2-3, would miss 1 and 2 breakdowns that
were detected by RHT (by not testing all the herds), but would involve fewer tests than scenarios
4-6. Scenario 4 would miss 2 breakdowns while scenarios 5-6 would miss 3 and 4, respectively that
were detected by RHT. However, scenarios 5-6 would test fewer herds than scenario 4 (scenario
6 would test even fewer than scenario 5 ). Finally scenarios 7-8, would not exempt any herds for
being tested, ’penalising’, this way, large herds with a more frequent testing regime, which could
serve as a disincentive to this behaviour. These scenarios provide a better surveillance than the
scenarios 2-5. Both scenarios would identify the 9 breakdowns detected by RHT, and scenario 8
would test fewer herds. However, by comparing the scenarios that had similar levels of surveillance
to the current one, scenario 1 would miss 2 breakdowns that were detected by RHT, while scenarios
7-8 would not miss any, but at the cost of testing more herds. In summary, Scenario 1 and 2
would keep the same number of detections and latent infections, would decrease substantially the
number of false positives, and would offer savings by testing fewer herds. Scenarios 7-8 would
also detect a similar number of breakdowns and number of latent infections, however, they would
increase the number of false positives, and test more herds than the current system. This model
accounts only for slaughterhouse surveillance and RHT, and to guarantee that extra breakdowns
will be detected, other types of tests that have been currently in place must be continued to be
implemented.
4. Use mathematical models to determine consequences of possible missed breakdowns.
A Bayesian likelihood model developed by O’Hare and Colleagues ([20]) has been used to determine
the consequences of reduced testing, and to identify possible epidemiological differences in the
transmission of bTB across herd types.
Figure 22 shows the distributions of the breakdown sizes in LRAs used to estimate the parameters
for each herd type (beef and dairy) used in the within-herd model. Breakdown sizes are defined
as the number of reactors at first breakdown. Only breakdowns that were detected by RHT or
tests triggered by slaughterhouse detection were included. Furthermore, there were only included
herds that did not have a previous breakdown. Analysis show that smaller breakdowns are more
frequent than larger breakdowns, with the number of beef herds that experience a break down
almost double the number of dairy at lower herd size, but with the discrepancy reduced when one
compares herds of larger extent.
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Figure 22: Frequency distributions of breakdown size for beef (blue) and dairy (red) herds in 2006.
The breakdown size is defined as the number of reactors at first breakdown. Only breakdowns that
were detected by RHT or tests triggered by slaughterhouse detection were included.
Derivation of the distributions used in the model
The age distribution used in the model was derived from the distribution of animal ages at the
time of a positive or negative test in GB in 2006 (as recorded in VetNet) and separated by herd
type (where the herd type is recorded as ’DAIRY’ or ’BEEF’ in VetNet) and the distribution of
ages of animals presented to slaughter (Figures 23 and 24). We identified 3 age groups from these
distribution and are given in Table 24.
From the age distribution of the national herd in 2006 we calculate the fraction of animals in each
identified age group. In each simulation we select a herd size and calculate the numbers of animals
in each age group from this.
We calculate the distribution of herd sizes from the size of each herd when it first suffered a
breakdown (i.e. using the same criteria used to obtain the breakdown size distribution to define
our likelihood) but also including herds that tested clear during the same time period. We did not
include follow-up tests due to inconclusive reactors.
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Figure 23: Age distributions of beef herds in GB in 2006 used to determine the age structure for
the model. The age of of the animals at the time of test (top) is calculated as the proportion of all
tests that either test positive or clear, inconclusives are ignored. The age distribution at slaughter
(bottom) is obtained from the age of the animals when presented at slaughter.
44
Figure 24: Age distributions of dairy herds in GB in 2006 used to determine the age structure for
the model. The age of of the animals at the time of test (top) is calculated as the proportions of all
tests that either test positive or clear, inconclusives are ignored. The age distribution at slaughter
(bottom) is obtained from the age of the animals when presented at slaughter.
Age (months) %age of Dairy Herds %age of Beef Herds
0 - 14 24.7% 49.5%
15 - 28 25.7% 39.4%
29 - 39 22.7% 4.1%
> 40 26.7% 7.2%
Table 18: Age distribution as a percentage of the overall herd size. The age distribution
of the herd is determined by considering the age distribution of the GB herd as a whole, the
age distribution of animals presented for routine testing and the age distribution of animals at
slaughter.
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Figure 25: Posterior distribution of the sampled parameters. Parameter description: β : trans-
mission rate; σ : rate of exposed cattle becoming test sensitive; γ : rate of test sensitive cattle
becoming infectious; Ωr : probability that a test sensitive or infectious; Ωs : probability that a
test sensitive or infectious animal is detected at abattoir; ζS : increased infectiousness of super-
spreaders; PS : proportion of individuals that are superspreaders; ζH : increase of β in herds with
high β; PH : proportion of herds with high β; and α : external force of infection. Beef herds are
represented in blue and dairy herds in red.
Figure 25 represents the posterior distribution of all the parameters sampled for both beef (blue colour)
and dairy (red colour). The distributions of each parameter suggest that dairy herds are more susceptible
to an external force of infection (subplot related to parameter α) and that beef herds might have a higher
rate of exposed cattle becoming test sensitive (subplot related to parameter σ). All the other parameters
seem to have a similar pattern when compared between beef and dairy herds.
Figures 26, 27 and 28 show results of simulations where RHT have been used and where there is slaugh-
terhouse surveillance only. These simulations were run only on herds that were persistently in LRAs for
the entire study period and where there was not a previous breakdown in the herd. Here, both beef and
dairy herds were analysed together. By having slaughterhouse alone as a testing regime, the breakdown
size would be bigger than if RHT had been implemented (Figure 26).
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Figure 26: Frequency distribution of the breakdown size (the number of reactors at first breakdown)
for dairy and beef herds together in persistent LRAs with RHT (red colour) and in the absence
of RHT (slaughterhouse only)(blue colour). The distributions are the result of simulations using
data from dairy and beef herds in GB.The number 8 on the x-axis represents ≥ 8 reactors.
Breakdown duration (episode length) with slaughterhouse alone would be longer than if RHT were
implemented, where 100% restrictions would have lasted 6 months with RHT, while they would have
lasted 20 months without it (Figure 27).



























Figure 27: Breakdown length with RHT (black line) and with slaughterhouse testing only (dashed
line) versus movement restrictions. The x-axis represents the episode length in months, while the
y-axis represents the percentage of movement restrictions that have been imposed.
Slaughterhouse alone would take much longer to detect infection than RHT and it would detect less than
50% of cases (Figure 28).
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Figure 28: Breakdown length with RHT (black line) and with slaughterhouse testing only (dashed
line) versus detected infections. The x-axis represents the episode length in months, while the
y-axis represents the percentage of detected infections.
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Discussion
This report has provided recommendations for improved surveillance for bTB that was presented in
four separate stages:
Identification of areas that could be epidemiologically classified as HRA, LRA and
TA.
In this section, we used the predictive model developed by [13] to exploit the spatial clustering of M.bovis
genotypes and gain insight into which geographical regions British cattle are at high risk of becoming
infected. This estimate was based on using a combination of spatial, network and genotype information
to explain the patterns of outbreaks and identifying when cattle movements are insufficient to explain
outbreak patterns, therefore requiring they be explained by spatially local risks. Based on results from
a previous Defra project (SE3243), the optimised HRA detection algorithm provides a more robust way
of identification of HRAs and therefore by extension, of transitional areas. Based on this new definition
of high risk quadrats, we were able to detect geographical infection before their perceived risk (identified
via implementation of annual testing), and to more rigorously identify future transition areas. We have
classified transitional areas as any that became high risk or low risk (after already being considered high
risk) during the study period. The disparity between the historical testing regime and our attributions of
HRAs suggest that the latter may be useful for refining future epidemiological analyses, and establishing
the best means of controlling the spread of bTB.
Identification of statistical risk factors
As the incidence of bTB continues to rise, it is important to develop an improved understanding of the
characteristics of the herds that are becoming infected in areas of different levels of risk. This can aid
control and surveillance of the disease to help to ensure that the disease is contained with the more
suitable surveillance strategies possible. The analyses presented in this report identify herds that are
more likely to have a bTB breakdown. Variables associated with the risk of infection appeared to depend
upon the local of incidence of the disease. The following risk factors were considered for analysis: herd
type, herd size, movements from HRAs in England and Wales, Irish imports, and predicted imputed
badger density. For both LRAs and HRAs, dairy herds have a similar risk profile to beef, however, for
the earlier period of LRAs they do not seem to be statistical significant. Finishing herds in HRAs are
the ones that have higher risk profile. Herd size was presented as a risk in all areas, but much higher in
LRAs suggesting that there might be a relationship between herd size and cattle imports from HRAs,
as bought in cattle are the most likely underlying associated risk factor, based both on our own results
and previous investigations. Imputed badger density only showed up as risk factor in LRAs and for the
later study period, which suggests that there might related with other local processes. Movements from
HRAs were considered as being a significant risk factor for all the areas. While they present a high risk
for LRAs, in HRAs they seem to have no relationship with an increase of risk since the herds are already
at a high risk of infection. In TAs, it seems that there is also not an increase of risk associated with
cattle movements from HRAs, which will need further exploration. Imports from Ireland only showed
up as a risk factor in the later period of LRAs, suggesting that their impact might be masked by other
factors in the earlier period. Any attribution of the raw risk factors epidemiologically (rather than as
an identification of correlation to likelihood of becoming infected) should therefore be used with caution.
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Identifying outcomes of revised surveillance strategies
By adopting a previously developed surveillance model that was used to identify targeted strategies in
Scotland, for herds in LRAs in England, a variety of testing regimes were considered with the aim of
identifying the impact on the breakdown identification under different surveillance levels. Our analyses
show that slaughterhouse surveillance leaves many unidentified, infected herds, and in contrast testing
all herds more frequently (every year or every two years) will also not increase the chances of detecting
many more infections due to the sensitivity of the skin test. It would also substantially increase the
cost of testing and would increase the number of false positives, since many more herds would be tested,
however, targeting some herds come be beneficial. Some of the risk-based surveillance scenarios seem
to offer advantages over others. Scenarios 1 and 2, which penalize herds that send a small proportion
of their stock to slaughter and that receive animals from high risk areas for more than three years,
seem to reduce the number of herds tested, the number of latent infections and the number of false
positives for a similar level of detection as the current four-year surveillance regime. Other also possible
beneficial scenarios would be scenarios 7 and 8, which penalize large herds and for a very similar level
of detection as the current regime can reduce the number of latent infections. Because these scenarios
test all herds either every year (very large herds) or every four years (smaller herds), the number of
tested herds is substantially higher than the current regime, increasing the number of false positives
and, subsequently, the cost associated to the implementation of this system. Even if the number of
detected infections does not improve by applying one of these systems, they are still very relevant not
only because of cost-related benefits but because they would reduce the number of latent infections,
which would avoid the hidden spread of the disease and make a huge impact on the future control of
bTB in LRAs. While there are potential savings to be made, we would stress the need to regularly
monitor the fit of outbreak distributions to risk factors identified here and elsewhere. By their nature,
the impact of correlation without necessarily causation means that the statistical relationship between
identified risks and outcomes can change or be broken down entirely, even when the identified risk factors
are also epidemiologically sensible. These changes can be due to many factors, most importantly human
behaviour, where individuals may respond to changes in regulations and social factors in unexpected
ways.
Within-herd models of bTB: Determine consequences of possible missed breakdowns
and identifying epidemiological risk factors for bTB infected herds
We used within-herd models of bTB transmission for two purposes first, to determine the consequences
of reduced testing, and second, to identify possible epidemiological differences in the transmission of
bTB across herd types. One of the consequences of a reduction in levels of active surveillance, is the
possibility of delays to detection of disease. Dynamic models of disease transmission are one way of
estimating the duration of such delays, and our models suggest that delays may be considerable, with
undetected infections lasting on average approximately twice as long as in the absence of RHT. This
is not likely to be an issue where RHT-exempt herds sell on relatively few cattle to other herds, and
may be mitigated by additional measures, for example, requiring pre-movement testing. In addition,
the increased number of infected cattle that are likely with such delays are also important, due to their
impact on farmer livelihood, however, the model suggests that while there are delays, even without RHT,
most herds return to OTF status quickly. Fitting these dynamics models (in this case, in HRAs) also
suggests that there is little to distinguish the within-herd transmission characteristics of beef and cattle
herds and, therefore, little evidence on which to base targeting surveillance on the basis of onward risk
to other herds. While these clearly experience different patterns of outbreak sizes when testing positive,
the model results are consistent with these differences being due to other things than transmission, in
particular, it appears that the dominant factor is the risk of exposure to bTB from sources outside the
herd. It is notable that the result that dairy herds are more exposed to external risk than beef herds is
also consistent with our statistical result that dairy herds experiencing breakdowns more frequently is
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an indicator of an incipient HRA, and may be worthy of further investigation.
This report provides a series of recommendations based on different bespoke analyses to determine
the value of risk-based surveillance where herds are at high risk and low risk of bTB infection, and
areas that are transitional between the two. The recommendations are largely based on combined
mathematical and statistical models fitted to the detailed outbreak data that are available in GB. A
critical consideration when reviewing these recommendations is the knowledge that the landscape of bTB
transmission to cattle herds in GB is always changing, because of natural factors (the epidemiology of
bTB in cattle and badgers), changes in the industry, and due to responses to changes in legislation. As
such, while in our view the principles behind the recommendations are sound and (as they are consistent
with epidemiological information) are likely to remain robust, the specifics of the recommendations would
require regular review and re-analysis.
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Conclusion
The key outcomes of our analyses are:
1. For herds in LRAs in England, movements from HRAs are a better predictor of risk of a breakdown
than for herds in Scotland (where a movement-based risk-surveillance strategy is already in place).
Further statistical analysis suggests that other factors such as herd size may be better predictors of
risk but these are highly correlated to movement volumes (and so this outcome is likely the result
of statistical correlation). As cattle movements are the most likely cause of this risk, further work
on targeting surveillance is based on a movement-based risk model. More intensive testing of some
high risk cattle herds appears to have little advantage, however a targeted surveillance would still
be worthwhile with a reduction or an increase of the number of herds tested. Therefore, it would
be advantageous to develop a cost-benefit analysis to validate these results.
2. For herds in HRAs in England, there is increased outbreak risk in finishing herds. There is also
suggestion that large herds are at a higher risk, however, there is not much difference between the
last two herd category sizes.
3. For herds in TAs in England and Wales, herd size and movements from high risk areas were
suggested as the most significative risk factors. Generally, herds of the size 351− 500 seem to be
the ones more at risk.
Our analyses suggest that there are useful ways in which surveillance can be targeted across all three
types of areas (LRAs, TAs and HRAs). However, some caveats remain:
1. Any identification of targeted strategies is more robust if the targeting is at the epidemiologically
significant factors, rather than correlated factors. As these models are (largely) statistical only,
external evidence on their epidemiological importance must be considered when choosing the most
likely candidates for targeting factors, rather than simply best statistical fit.
2. In particular for TAs, because the epidemiological factors for this area are poorly understood
and may differ across regions, any results must be treated with particular caution. As well, the
relatively small size of the areas considered and few herds means that the statistical significance is
harder to identify.
3. Any change in surveillance may have unintended consequences for farmer behaviour and these must
also be carefully considered.
4. While imputed badger density was a considered risk factor, the counterintuitive outcomes, and
possible issues associated with interpreting these outcomes have led us to reject further use of
them in the risk factor model, and more generally suggest some caution should be extended to
using these density estimates as risk factors for bTB without further validation.
5. The Scottish-risk based surveillance model presented different results from the ones known to the
Scottish data for the period 2003-2008, mainly related to the better (renamed as scenario 1 for
the LRA England study) surveillance system, which showed similar number of detected infections
than the current surveillance scenario. This suggests that the epidemiological signatures between
Scotland and LRA England might be very different. In particular, because the factors that are
most correlated with high breakdown risk in LRAs need further investigation to establish their
epidemiological significance (most importantly, the role of imputed badger density), more research
of the underlying risk factors must be considered before establishing more targeted and or more
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intensive surveillance schemes. As the framework used is scalable, has a flexible configuration and
is adaptable, it is straightforward to modify or incorporate other surveillance scenarios, as well
as possible future policy developments, such as the introduction of post movement testing, for
example.
Further work:
• Identify TAs for all spoligotypes including recent years to improve statistical power.
• Epidemiological study to consider dairy herds as potential sentinels for incipient high risk areas.
• Investigate relationships between risk factors to determine the imputed badger density models, and
cattle herd bTB risk factors.
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